Reply Obj. 2:  Fear is twofold, servile and filial, as we shall state further on (II-II, Q. 19, A. 2).  Servile fear regards punishment, and will be impossible in the life of glory, since there will no longer be possibility of being punished.  Filial fear has two acts:  one is an act of reverence to God, and with regard to this act, it remains:  the other is an act of fear lest we be separated from God, and as regards this act, it does not remain.  Because separation from God is in the nature of an evil:  and no evil will be feared there, according to Prov. 1:33:  “He . . . shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils.”  Now fear is opposed to hope by opposition of good and evil, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 2; Q. 40, A. 1), and therefore the fear which will remain in glory is not opposed to hope.  In the lost there can be fear of punishment, rather than hope of glory in the Blessed.  Because in the lost there will be a succession of punishments, so that the notion of something future remains there, which is the object of fear:  but the glory of the saints has no succession, by reason of its being a kind of participation of eternity, wherein there is neither past nor future, but only the present.  And yet, properly speaking, neither in the lost is there fear.  For, as stated above (Q. 42, A. 2), fear is never without some hope of escape:  and the lost have no such hope.  Consequently neither will there be fear in them; except speaking in a general way, in so far as any expectation of future evil is called fear.

Reply Obj. 3:  As to the glory of the soul, there can be no desire in the Blessed, in so far as desire looks for something future, for the reason already given (ad 2).  Yet hunger and thirst are said to be in them because they never weary, and for the same reason desire is said to be in the angels.  With regard to the glory of the body, there can be desire in the souls of the saints, but not hope, properly speaking; neither as a theological virtue, for thus its object is God, and not a created good; nor in its general signification.  Because the object of hope is something difficult, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 1):  while a good whose unerring cause we already possess, is not compared to us as something difficult.  Hence he that has money is not, properly speaking, said to hope for what he can buy at once.  In like manner those who have the glory of the soul are not, properly speaking, said to hope for the glory of the body, but only to desire it. ________________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 67, Art. 5]

Whether Anything of Faith or Hope Remains in Glory?

Objection 1:  It would seem that something of faith and hope remains in glory.  For when that which is proper to a thing is removed, there remains what is common; thus it is stated in De Causis that “if you take away rational, there remains living, and when you remove living, there remains being.”  Now in faith there is something that it has in common with beatitude, viz. knowledge:  and there is something proper to it, viz. darkness, for faith is knowledge in a dark manner.  Therefore, the darkness of faith removed, the knowledge of faith still remains.