Reply Obj. 1:  Faith is more excellent than science, on the part of the object, because its object is the First Truth.  Yet science has a more perfect mode of knowing its object, which is not incompatible with vision which is the perfection of happiness, as the mode of faith is incompatible.

Reply Obj. 2:  Faith is the foundation in as much as it is knowledge:  consequently when this knowledge is perfected, the foundation will be perfected also.

The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 67, Art. 4]

Whether Hope Remains After Death, in the State of Glory?

Objection 1:  It would seem that hope remains after death, in the state of glory.  Because hope perfects the human appetite in a more excellent manner than the moral virtues.  But the moral virtues remain after this life, as Augustine clearly states (De Trin. xiv, 9).  Much more then does hope remain.

Obj. 2:  Further, fear is opposed to hope.  But fear remains after this life:  in the Blessed, filial fear, which abides for ever—­in the lost, the fear of punishment.  Therefore, in a like manner, hope can remain.

Obj. 3:  Further, just as hope is of future good, so is desire.  Now in the Blessed there is desire for future good; both for the glory of the body, which the souls of the Blessed desire, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35); and for the glory of the soul, according to Ecclus. 24:29:  “They that eat me, shall yet hunger, and they that drink me, shall yet thirst,” and 1 Pet. 1:12:  “On Whom the angels desire to look.”  Therefore it seems that there can be hope in the Blessed after this life is past.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 8:24):  “What a man seeth, why doth he hope for?” But the Blessed see that which is the object of hope, viz.  God.  Therefore they do not hope.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), that which, in its very nature, implies imperfection of its subject, is incompatible with the opposite perfection in that subject.  Thus it is evident that movement of its very nature implies imperfection of its subject, since it is “the act of that which is in potentiality as such” (Phys. iii):  so that as soon as this potentiality is brought into act, the movement ceases; for a thing does not continue to become white, when once it is made white.  Now hope denotes a movement towards that which is not possessed, as is clear from what we have said above about the passion of hope (Q. 40, AA. 1, 2).  Therefore when we possess that which we hope for, viz. the enjoyment of God, it will no longer be possible to have hope.

Reply Obj. 1:  Hope surpasses the moral virtues as to its object, which is God.  But the acts of the moral virtues are not incompatible with the perfection of happiness, as the act of hope is; except perhaps, as regards their matter, in respect of which they do not remain.  For moral virtue perfects the appetite, not only in respect of what is not yet possessed, but also as regards something which is in our actual possession.