Obj. 3:  Further, temperance and fortitude, which are moral virtues, are in the irrational parts of the soul, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 10).  Now the irrational parts of the soul are corrupted, when the body is corrupted:  since they are acts of bodily organs.  Therefore it seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this life.

On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 1:15) that “justice is perpetual and immortal.”

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), Cicero held that the cardinal virtues do not remain after this life; and that, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), “in the other life men are made happy by the mere knowledge of that nature, than which nothing is better or more lovable, that Nature, to wit, which created all others.”  Afterwards he concludes that these four virtues remain in the future life, but after a different manner.

In order to make this evident, we must note that in these virtues there is a formal element, and a quasi-material element.  The material element in these virtues is a certain inclination of the appetitive part to the passions and operations according to a certain mode:  and since this mode is fixed by reason, the formal element is precisely this order of reason.

Accordingly we must say that these moral virtues do not remain in the future life, as regards their material element.  For in the future life there will be no concupiscences and pleasures in matters of food and sex; nor fear and daring about dangers of death; nor distributions and commutations of things employed in this present life.  But, as regards the formal element, they will remain most perfect, after this life, in the Blessed, in as much as each one’s reason will have most perfect rectitude in regard to things concerning him in respect of that state of life:  and his appetitive power will be moved entirely according to the order of reason, in things pertaining to that same state.  Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9) that “prudence will be there without any danger of error; fortitude, without the anxiety of bearing with evil; temperance, without the rebellion of the desires:  so that prudence will neither prefer nor equal any good to God; fortitude will adhere to Him most steadfastly; and temperance will delight in Him Who knows no imperfection.”  As to justice, it is yet more evident what will be its act in that life, viz. “to be subject to God”:  because even in this life subjection to a superior is part of justice.

Reply Obj. 1:  The Philosopher is speaking there of these moral virtues, as to their material element; thus he speaks of justice, as regards “commutations and distributions”; of fortitude, as to “matters of terror and danger”; of temperance, in respect of “lewd desires.”

The same applies to the Second Objection.  For those things that concern the active life, belong to the material element of the virtues.