Reply Obj. 4:  The truth and knowledge of indemonstrable principles depends on the meaning of the terms:  for as soon as we know what is a whole, and what is a part, we know at once that every whole is greater than its part.  Now to know the meaning of being and non-being, of whole and part, and of other things consequent to being, which are the terms whereof indemonstrable principles are constituted, is the function of wisdom:  since universal being is the proper effect of the Supreme Cause, which is God.  And so wisdom makes use of indemonstrable principles which are the object of understanding, not only by drawing conclusions from them, as other sciences do, but also by passing its judgment on them, and by vindicating them against those who deny them.  Hence it follows that wisdom is a greater virtue than understanding. ________________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 6]

Whether Charity Is the Greatest of the Theological Virtues?

Objection 1:  It would seem that charity is not the greatest of the theological virtues.  Because, since faith is in the intellect, while hope and charity are in the appetitive power, it seems that faith is compared to hope and charity, as intellectual to moral virtue.  Now intellectual virtue is greater than moral virtue, as was made evident above (Q. 62, A. 3).  Therefore faith is greater than hope and charity.

Obj. 2:  Further, when two things are added together, the result is greater than either one.  Now hope results from something added to charity; for it presupposes love, as Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), and it adds a certain movement of stretching forward to the beloved.  Therefore hope is greater than charity.

Obj. 3:  Further, a cause is more noble than its effect.  Now faith and hope are the cause of charity:  for a gloss on Matt. 1:3 says that “faith begets hope, and hope charity.”  Therefore faith and hope are greater than charity.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13):  “Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity.”

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object.  Now, since the three theological virtues look at God as their proper object, it cannot be said that any one of them is greater than another by reason of its having a greater object, but only from the fact that it approaches nearer than another to that object; and in this way charity is greater than the others.  Because the others, in their very nature, imply a certain distance from the object:  since faith is of what is not seen, and hope is of what is not possessed.  But the love of charity is of that which is already possessed:  since the beloved is, in a manner, in the lover, and, again, the lover is drawn by desire to union with the beloved; hence it is written (1 John 4:16):  “He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him.”