Reply Obj. 1:  The act of liberality needs to be founded on an act of justice, for “a man is not liberal in giving, unless he gives of his own” (Polit. ii, 3).  Hence there could be no liberality apart from justice, which discerns between “meum” and “tuum”:  whereas justice can be without liberality.  Hence justice is simply greater than liberality, as being more universal, and as being its foundation:  while liberality is greater relatively since it is an ornament and an addition to justice.

Reply Obj. 2:  Patience is said to have “a perfect work,” by enduring evils, wherein it excludes not only unjust revenge, which is also excluded by justice; not only hatred, which is also suppressed by charity; nor only anger, which is calmed by gentleness; but also inordinate sorrow, which is the root of all the above.  Wherefore it is more perfect and excellent through plucking up the root in this matter.  It is not, however, more perfect than all the other virtues simply.  Because fortitude not only endures trouble without being disturbed, but also fights against it if necessary.  Hence whoever is brave is patient; but the converse does not hold, for patience is a part of fortitude.

Reply Obj. 3:  There can be no magnanimity without the other virtues, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3.  Hence it is compared to them as their ornament, so that relatively it is greater than all the others, but not simply. ________________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 5]

Whether Wisdom Is the Greatest of the Intellectual Virtues?

Objection 1:  It would seem that wisdom is not the greatest of the intellectual virtues.  Because the commander is greater than the one commanded.  Now prudence seems to command wisdom, for it is stated in Ethic. i, 2 that political science, which belongs to prudence (Ethic. vi, 8), “orders that sciences should be cultivated in states, and to which of these each individual should devote himself, and to what extent.”  Since, then, wisdom is one of the sciences, it seems that prudence is greater than wisdom.

Obj. 2:  Further, it belongs to the nature of virtue to direct man to happiness:  because virtue is “the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best,” as stated in Phys. vii, text. 17.  Now prudence is “right reason about things to be done,” whereby man is brought to happiness:  whereas wisdom takes no notice of human acts, whereby man attains happiness.  Therefore prudence is a greater virtue than wisdom.

Obj. 3:  Further, the more perfect knowledge is, the greater it seems to be.  Now we can have more perfect knowledge of human affairs, which are the subject of science, than of Divine things, which are the object of wisdom, which is the distinction given by Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14):  because Divine things are incomprehensible, according to Job 26:26:  “Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge.”  Therefore science is a greater virtue than wisdom.