Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 1,748 pages of information about Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae).

Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 1,748 pages of information about Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae).

The other kind of connection among virtues followed the opinion of those who hold these virtues to have their own proper respective matters (Q. 65, AA. 1, 2).  In this way the connection among moral virtues results from prudence, and, as to the infused virtues, from charity, and not from the inclination, which is on the part of the subject, as stated above (Q. 65, A. 1).  Accordingly the nature of the equality among virtues can also be considered on the part of prudence, in regard to that which is formal in all the moral virtues:  for in one and the same man, so long as his reason has the same degree of perfection, the mean will be proportionately defined according to right reason in each matter of virtue.

But in regard to that which is material in the moral virtues, viz. the inclination to the virtuous act, one may be readier to perform the act of one virtue, than the act of another virtue, and this either from nature, or from habituation, or again by the grace of God.

Reply Obj. 1:  This saying of the Apostle may be taken to refer to the gifts of gratuitous grace, which are not common to all, nor are all of them equal in the one same subject.  We might also say that it refers to the measure of sanctifying grace, by reason of which one man has all the virtues in greater abundance than another man, on account of his greater abundance of prudence, or also of charity, in which all the infused virtues are connected.

Reply Obj. 2:  One saint is praised chiefly for one virtue, another saint for another virtue, on account of his more admirable readiness for the act of one virtue than for the act of another virtue.

This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 3]

Whether the Moral Virtues Are Better Than the Intellectual Virtues?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the moral virtues are better than the intellectual.  Because that which is more necessary, and more lasting, is better.  Now the moral virtues are “more lasting even than the sciences” (Ethic. i) which are intellectual virtues:  and, moreover, they are more necessary for human life.  Therefore they are preferable to the intellectual virtues.

Obj. 2:  Further, virtue is defined as “that which makes its possessor good.”  Now man is said to be good in respect of moral virtue, and art in respect of intellectual virtue, except perhaps in respect of prudence alone.  Therefore moral is better than intellectual virtue.

Obj. 3:  Further, the end is more excellent than the means.  But according to Ethic. vi, 12, “moral virtue gives right intention of the end; whereas prudence gives right choice of the means.”  Therefore moral virtue is more excellent than prudence, which is the intellectual virtue that regards moral matters.

On the contrary, Moral virtue is in that part of the soul which is rational by participation; while intellectual virtue is in the essentially rational part, as stated in Ethic. i, 13.  Now rational by essence is more excellent than rational by participation.  Therefore intellectual virtue is better than moral virtue.

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