The question can be taken in another way, as referring to virtues of the same species.  In this way, according to what was said above (Q. 52, A. 1), when we were treating of the intensity of habits, virtue may be said to be greater or less in two ways:  first, in itself; secondly with regard to the subject that partakes of it.  If we consider it in itself, we shall call it great or little, according to the things to which it extends.  Now whosoever has a virtue, e.g. temperance, has it in respect of whatever temperance extends to.  But this does not apply to science and art:  for every grammarian does not know everything relating to grammar.  And in this sense the Stoics said rightly, as Simplicius states in his Commentary on the Predicaments, that virtue cannot be more or less, as science and art can; because the nature of virtue consists in a maximum.

If, however, we consider virtue on the part of the subject, it may then be greater or less, either in relation to different times, or in different men.  Because one man is better disposed than another to attain to the mean of virtue which is defined by right reason; and this, on account of either greater habituation, or a better natural disposition, or a more discerning judgment of reason, or again a greater gift of grace, which is given to each one “according to the measure of the giving of Christ,” as stated in Eph. 4:9.  And here the Stoics erred, for they held that no man should be deemed virtuous, unless he were, in the highest degree, disposed to virtue.  Because the nature of virtue does not require that man should reach the mean of right reason as though it were an indivisible point, as the Stoics thought; but it is enough that he should approach the mean, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6.  Moreover, one same indivisible mark is reached more nearly and more readily by one than by another:  as may be seen when several archers aim at a fixed target.

Reply Obj. 1:  This equality is not one of absolute quantity, but of proportion:  because all virtues grow in a man proportionately, as we shall see further on (A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2:  This “limit” which belongs to virtue, can have the character of something more or less good, in the ways explained above:  since, as stated, it is not an indivisible limit.

Reply Obj. 3:  God does not work by necessity of nature, but according to the order of His wisdom, whereby He bestows on men various measures of virtue, according to Eph. 4:7:  “To every one of you [Vulg.:  ‘us’] is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ.” ________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 2]

Whether All the Virtues That Are Together in One Man, Are Equal?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the virtues in one same man are not all equally intense.  For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:7):  “Everyone hath his proper gift from God; one after this manner, and another after that.”  Now one gift would not be more proper than another to a man, if God infused all the virtues equally into each man.  Therefore it seems that the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man.