(2) Whether all the virtues existing together in one subject are equal?

(3) Of moral virtue in comparison with intellectual virtue;

(4) Of the moral virtues as compared with one another;

(5) Of the intellectual virtues in comparison with one another;

(6) Of the theological virtues in comparison with one another.
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 1]

Whether One Virtue Can Be Greater or Less Than Another?

Objection 1:  It would seem that one virtue cannot be greater or less than another.  For it is written (Apoc. 21:16) that the sides of the city of Jerusalem are equal; and a gloss says that the sides denote the virtues.  Therefore all virtues are equal; and consequently one cannot be greater than another.

Obj. 2:  Further, a thing that, by its nature, consists in a maximum, cannot be more or less.  Now the nature of virtue consists in a maximum, for virtue is “the limit of power,” as the Philosopher states (De Coelo i, text. 116); and Augustine says (De Lib.  Arb. ii, 19) that “virtues are very great boons, and no one can use them to evil purpose.”  Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater or less than another.

Obj. 3:  Further, the quantity of an effect is measured by the power of the agent.  But perfect, viz. infused virtues, are from God Whose power is uniform and infinite.  Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater than another.

On the contrary, Wherever there can be increase and greater abundance, there can be inequality.  Now virtues admit of greater abundance and increase:  for it is written (Matt. 5:20):  “Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven”:  and (Prov. 15:5):  “In abundant justice there is the greatest strength (virtus).”  Therefore it seems that a virtue can be greater or less than another.

I answer that, When it is asked whether one virtue can be greater than another, the question can be taken in two senses.  First, as applying to virtues of different species.  In this sense it is clear that one virtue is greater than another; since a cause is always more excellent than its effect; and among effects, those nearest to the cause are the most excellent.  Now it is clear from what has been said (Q. 18, A. 5; Q. 61, A. 2) that the cause and root of human good is the reason.  Hence prudence which perfects the reason, surpasses in goodness the other moral virtues which perfect the appetitive power, in so far as it partakes of reason.  And among these, one is better than another, according as it approaches nearer to the reason.  Consequently justice, which is in the will, excels the remaining moral virtues; and fortitude, which is in the irascible part, stands before temperance, which is in the concupiscible, which has a smaller share of reason, as stated in Ethic. vii, 6.