This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3:  The intellectual virtues are about divers matters having no relation to one another, as is clearly the case with the various sciences and arts.  Hence we do not observe in them the connection that is to be found among the moral virtues, which are about passions and operations, that are clearly related to one another.  For all the passions have their rise in certain initial passions, viz. love and hatred, and terminate in certain others, viz. pleasure and sorrow.  In like manner all the operations that are the matter of moral virtue are related to one another, and to the passions.  Hence the whole matter of moral virtues falls under the one rule of prudence.

Nevertheless, all intelligible things are related to first principles.  And in this way, all the intellectual virtues depend on the understanding of principles; even as prudence depends on the moral virtues, as stated.  On the other hand, the universal principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding of principles, do not depend on the conclusions, which are the objects of the other intellectual virtues, as do the moral virtues depend on prudence, because the appetite, in a fashion, moves the reason, and the reason the appetite, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 1; Q. 58, A. 5, ad 1).

Reply Obj. 4:  Those things to which the moral virtues incline, are as the principles of prudence:  whereas the products of art are not the principles, but the matter of art.  Now it is evident that, though reason may be right in one part of the matter, and not in another, yet in no way can it be called right reason, if it be deficient in any principle whatever.  Thus, if a man be wrong about the principle, “A whole is greater than its part,” he cannot acquire the science of geometry, because he must necessarily wander from the truth in his conclusion.  Moreover, things done are related to one another, but not things made, as stated above (ad 3).  Consequently the lack of prudence in one department of things to be done, would result in a deficiency affecting other things to be done:  whereas this does not occur in things to be made. ________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 65, Art. 2]

Whether Moral Virtues Can Be Without Charity?

Objection 1:  It would seem that moral virtues can be without charity.  For it is stated in the Liber Sentent.  Prosperi vii, that “every virtue save charity may be common to the good and bad.”  But “charity can be in none except the good,” as stated in the same book.  Therefore the other virtues can be had without charity.

Obj. 2:  Further, moral virtues can be acquired by means of human acts, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1, 2, whereas charity cannot be had otherwise than by infusion, according to Rom. 5:5:  “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us.”  Therefore it is possible to have the other virtues without charity.