The other rule or measure of theological virtue is by comparison with us:  for although we cannot be borne towards God as much as we ought, yet we should approach to Him by believing, hoping and loving, according to the measure of our condition.  Consequently it is possible to find a mean and extremes in theological virtue, accidentally and in reference to us.

Reply Obj. 1:  The good of intellectual and moral virtues consists in a mean of reason by conformity with a measure that may be exceeded:  whereas this is not so in the case of theological virtue, considered in itself, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2:  Moral and intellectual virtues perfect our intellect and appetite in relation to a created measure and rule; whereas the theological virtues perfect them in relation to an uncreated rule and measure.  Wherefore the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3:  Hope observes the mean between presumption and despair, in relation to us, in so far, to wit, as a man is said to be presumptuous, through hoping to receive from God a good in excess of his condition; or to despair through failing to hope for that which according to his condition he might hope for.  But there can be no excess of hope in comparison with God, Whose goodness is infinite.  In like manner faith holds a middle course between contrary heresies, not by comparison with its object, which is God, in Whom we cannot believe too much; but in so far as human opinion itself takes a middle position between contrary opinions, as was explained above. ________________________

QUESTION 65

OF THE CONNECTION OF VIRTUES
(In Five Articles)

We must now consider the connection of virtues:  under which head there are five points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?

(2) Whether the moral virtues can be without charity?

(3) Whether charity can be without them?

(4) Whether faith and hope can be without charity?

(5) Whether charity can be without them?
________________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 65, Art. 1]

Whether the Moral Virtues Are Connected with One Another?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the moral virtues are not connected with one another.  Because moral virtues are sometimes caused by the exercise of acts, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 1, 2.  But man can exercise himself in the acts of one virtue, without exercising himself in the acts of some other virtue.  Therefore it is possible to have one moral virtue without another.

Obj. 2:  Further, magnificence and magnanimity are moral virtues.  Now a man may have other moral virtues without having magnificence or magnanimity:  for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2, 3) that “a poor man cannot be magnificent,” and yet he may have other virtues; and (Ethic. iv) that “he who is worthy of small things, and so accounts his worth, is modest, but not magnanimous.”  Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with one another.