(1) Whether moral virtue observes the mean?

(2) Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean or the rational mean?

(3) Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?

(4) Whether the theological virtues do?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 64, Art. 1]

Whether Moral Virtues Observe the Mean?

Objection 1:  It would seem that moral virtue does not observe the mean.  For the nature of a mean is incompatible with that which is extreme.  Now the nature of virtue is to be something extreme; for it is stated in De Coelo i that “virtue is the limit of power.”  Therefore moral virtue does not observe the mean.

Obj. 2:  Further, the maximum is not a mean.  Now some moral virtues tend to a maximum:  for instance, magnanimity to very great honors, and magnificence to very large expenditure, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2, 3.  Therefore not every moral virtue observes the mean.

Obj. 3:  Further, if it is essential to a moral virtue to observe the mean, it follows that a moral virtue is not perfected, but the contrary corrupted, through tending to something extreme.  Now some moral virtues are perfected by tending to something extreme; thus virginity, which abstains from all sexual pleasure, observes the extreme, and is the most perfect chastity:  and to give all to the poor is the most perfect mercy or liberality.  Therefore it seems that it is not essential to moral virtue that it should observe the mean.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that “moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean.”

I answer that, As already explained (Q. 55, A. 3), the nature of virtue is that it should direct man to good.  Now moral virtue is properly a perfection of the appetitive part of the soul in regard to some determinate matter:  and the measure or rule of the appetitive movement in respect of appetible objects is the reason.  But the good of that which is measured or ruled consists in its conformity with its rule:  thus the good things made by art is that they follow the rule of art.  Consequently, in things of this sort, evil consists in discordance from their rule or measure.  Now this may happen either by their exceeding the measure or by their falling short of it; as is clearly the case in all things ruled or measured.  Hence it is evident that the good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule of reason.  Now it is clear that between excess and deficiency the mean is equality or conformity.  Therefore it is evident that moral virtue observes the mean.