I answer that, There is a twofold specific difference among habits.  The first, as stated above (Q. 54, A. 2; Q. 56, A. 2; Q. 60, A. 1), is taken from the specific and formal aspects of their objects.  Now the object of every virtue is a good considered as in that virtue’s proper matter:  thus the object of temperance is a good in respect of the pleasures connected with the concupiscence of touch.  The formal aspect of this object is from reason which fixes the mean in these concupiscences:  while the material element is something on the part of the concupiscences.  Now it is evident that the mean that is appointed in such like concupiscences according to the rule of human reason, is seen under a different aspect from the mean which is fixed according to Divine rule.  For instance, in the consumption of food, the mean fixed by human reason, is that food should not harm the health of the body, nor hinder the use of reason:  whereas, according to the Divine rule, it behooves man to “chastise his body, and bring it into subjection” (1 Cor. 9:27), by abstinence in food, drink and the like.  It is therefore evident that infused and acquired temperance differ in species; and the same applies to the other virtues.

The other specific difference among habits is taken from the things to which they are directed:  for a man’s health and a horse’s are not of the same species, on account of the difference between the natures to which their respective healths are directed.  In the same sense, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3) that citizens have diverse virtues according as they are well directed to diverse forms of government.  In the same way, too, those infused moral virtues, whereby men behave well in respect of their being “fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household [Douay:  ‘domestics’] of God” (Eph. 2:19), differ from the acquired virtues, whereby man behaves well in respect of human affairs.

Reply Obj. 1:  Infused and acquired virtue differ not only in relation to the ultimate end, but also in relation to their proper objects, as stated.

Reply Obj. 2:  Both acquired and infused temperance moderate desires for pleasures of touch, but for different reasons, as stated:  wherefore their respective acts are not identical.

Reply Obj. 3:  God gave the man born blind an eye for the same act as the act for which other eyes are formed naturally:  consequently it was of the same species.  It would be the same if God wished to give a man miraculously virtues, such as those that are acquired by acts.  But the case is not so in the question before us, as stated. ________________________

QUESTION 64

OF THE MEAN OF VIRTUE
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the properties of virtues:  and (1) the mean of virtue, (2) the connection between virtues, (3) equality of virtues, (4) the duration of virtues.  Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: