On the contrary, Macrobius says (Super Somn.  Scip. 1):  “Plotinus, together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says:  ’The four kinds of virtue are fourfold:  In the first place there are social* virtues; secondly, there are perfecting virtues [Virtutes purgatoriae:  literally meaning, cleansing virtues]; thirdly, there are perfect [Virtutes purgati animi:  literally, virtues of the clean soul] virtues; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues.’” [Cf.  Chrysostom’s fifteenth homily on St. Matthew, where he says:  “The gentle, the modest, the merciful, the just man does not shut up his good deeds within himself . . .  He that is clean of heart and peaceful, and suffers persecution for the sake of the truth, lives for the common weal.”]

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), “the soul needs to follow something in order to give birth to virtue:  this something is God:  if we follow Him we shall live aright.”  Consequently the exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just as in Him pre-exist the types of all things.  Accordingly virtue may be considered as existing originally in God, and thus we speak of “exemplar” virtues:  so that in God the Divine Mind itself may be called prudence; while temperance is the turning of God’s gaze on Himself, even as in us it is that which conforms the appetite to reason.  God’s fortitude is His unchangeableness; His justice is the observance of the Eternal Law in His works, as Plotinus states (Cf.  Macrobius, Super Somn.  Scip. 1).

Again, since man by his nature is a social [See above note on Chrysostom] animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in him according to the condition of his nature, are called “social” virtues; since it is by reason of them that man behaves himself well in the conduct of human affairs.  It is in this sense that we have been speaking of these virtues until now.

But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in Ethic. x, 7, and as Scripture often admonishes us—­for instance:  “Be ye . . . perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect” (Matt. 5:48), we must needs place some virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues which are Divine.  Now these virtues differ by reason of a difference of movement and term:  so that some are virtues of men who are on their way and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these are called “perfecting” virtues.  Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of God, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs all the thoughts of the soul to God alone:  temperance, so far as nature allows, neglects the needs of the body; fortitude prevents the soul from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted consent to follow the way thus proposed.  Besides these there are the virtues of those who have already attained to the Divine similitude:  these are called the “perfect virtues.”  Thus prudence sees nought else but the things of God; temperance knows no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge of passion; and justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is united thereto by an everlasting covenant.  Such as the virtues attributed to the Blessed, or, in this life, to some who are at the summit of perfection.