not to go too far, which is much easier; and in this sense fortitude is said to be temperate.  Again, temperance is said to be brave, by reason of fortitude overflowing into temperance:  in so far, to wit, as he whose mind is strengthened by fortitude against dangers of death, which is a matter of very great difficulty, is more able to remain firm against the onslaught of pleasures; for as Cicero says (De Offic. i), “it would be inconsistent for a man to be unbroken by fear, and yet vanquished by cupidity; or that he should be conquered by lust, after showing himself to be unconquered by toil.”

From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear.  For temperance observes the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps the mind unbent by the enticements of pleasures, either in so far as these virtues are taken to denote certain general conditions of virtue, or in the sense that they overflow on to one another, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 3:  These four general conditions of virtue set down by the Philosopher, are not proper to the aforesaid virtues.  They may, however, be appropriated to them, in the way above stated. ________________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 61, Art. 5]

Whether the Cardinal Virtues Are Fittingly Divided into Social
Virtues, Perfecting, Perfect, and Exemplar Virtues?

Objection 1:  It would seem that these four virtues are unfittingly divided into exemplar virtues, perfecting virtues, perfect virtues, and social virtues.  For as Macrobius says (Super Somn.  Scip. 1), the “exemplar virtues are such as exist in the mind of God.”  Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that “it is absurd to ascribe justice, fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God.”  Therefore these virtues cannot be exemplar.

Obj. 2:  Further, the perfect virtues are those which are without any passion:  for Macrobius says (Super Somn.  Scip. 1) that “in a soul that is cleansed, temperance has not to check worldly desires, for it has forgotten all about them:  fortitude knows nothing about the passions; it does not have to conquer them.”  Now it was stated above (Q. 59, A. 5) that the aforesaid virtues cannot be without passions.  Therefore there is no such thing as perfect virtue.

Obj. 3:  Further, he says (Macrobius:  Super Somn.  Scip. 1) that the “perfecting” virtues are those of the man “who flies from human affairs and devotes himself exclusively to the things of God.”  But it seems wrong to do this, for Cicero says (De Offic. i):  “I reckon that it is not only unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say that he despises what most men admire, viz. power and office.”  Therefore there are no “perfecting” virtues.

Obj. 4:  Further, he says (Macrobius:  Super Somn.  Scip. 1) that the “social” virtues are those “whereby good men work for the good of their country and for the safety of the city.”  But it is only legal justice that is directed to the common weal, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1).  Therefore other virtues should not be called “social.”