[*_philia_], and may be rendered “affability.”  Secondly, one man behaves towards another by being frank with him, in words and deeds:  this belongs to another virtue which (Ethic. iv, 7) he calls “truthfulness” [*_aletheia_].  For frankness is more akin to the reason than pleasure, and serious matters than play.  Hence there is another virtue about the pleasures of games, which the Philosopher calls eutrapelia (Ethic. iv, 8).

It is therefore evident that, according to Aristotle, there are ten moral virtues about the passions, viz. fortitude, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, philotimia, gentleness, friendship, truthfulness, and eutrapelia, all of which differ in respect of their diverse matter, passions, or objects:  so that if we add justice, which is about operations, there will be eleven in all.

Reply Obj. 1:  All objects of the same specific operation have the same relation to reason:  not so all the objects of the same specific passion; because operations do not thwart reason as the passions do.

Reply Obj. 2:  Passions are not differentiated by the same rule as virtues are, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3:  More and less do not cause a difference of species, unless they bear different relations to reason.

Reply Obj. 4:  Good is a more potent mover than evil:  because evil does not cause movement save in virtue of good, as Dionysius states (Div.  Nom. iv).  Hence an evil does not prove an obstacle to reason, so as to require virtues unless that evil be great; there being, seemingly, one such evil corresponding to each kind of passion.  Hence there is but one virtue, meekness, for every form of anger; and, again, but one virtue, fortitude, for all forms of daring.  On the other hand, good involves difficulty, which requires virtue, even if it be not a great good in that particular kind of passion.  Consequently there are various moral virtues about desires, as stated above. ________________________

QUESTION 61

OF THE CARDINAL VIRTUES
(In Five Articles)

We must now consider the cardinal virtues:  under which head there are five points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?

(2) Of their number;

(3) Which are they?

(4) Whether they differ from one another?

(5) Whether they are fittingly divided into social, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues? ________________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 61, Art. 1]

Whether the Moral Virtues Should Be Called Cardinal or Principal
Virtues?

Objection 1:  It would seem that moral virtues should not be called cardinal or principal virtues.  For “the opposite members of a division are by nature simultaneous” (Categor. x), so that one is not principal rather than another.  Now all the virtues are opposite members of the division of the genus “virtue.”  Therefore none of them should be called principal.