a difference of virtues.  Consequently man’s good which is the object of love, desire and pleasure, may be taken as referred either to a bodily sense, or to the inner apprehension of the mind:  and this same good may be directed to man’s good in himself, either in his body or in his soul, or to man’s good in relation to other men.  And every such difference, being differently related to reason, differentiates virtues.

Accordingly, if we take a good, and it be something discerned by the sense of touch, and something pertaining to the upkeep of human life either in the individual or in the species, such as the pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse, it will belong to the virtue of temperance. As regards the pleasures of the other senses, they are not intense, and so do not present much difficulty to the reason:  hence there is no virtue corresponding to them; for virtue, “like art, is about difficult things” (Ethic. ii, 3).

On the other hand, good discerned not by the senses, but by an inner power, and belonging to man in himself, is like money and honor; the former, by its very nature, being employable for the good of the body, while the latter is based on the apprehension of the mind.  These goods again may be considered either absolutely, in which way they concern the concupiscible faculty, or as being difficult to obtain, in which way they belong to the irascible part:  which distinction, however, has no place in pleasurable objects of touch; since such are of base condition, and are becoming to man in so far as he has something in common with irrational animals.  Accordingly in reference to money considered as a good absolutely, as an object of desire, pleasure, or love, there is liberality:  but if we consider this good as difficult to get, and as being the object of our hope, there is magnificence [*_megaloprepeia_].  With regard to that good which we call honor, taken absolutely, as the object of love, we have a virtue called philotimia, i.e. love of honor:  while if we consider it as hard to attain, and as an object of hope, then we have magnanimity. Wherefore liberality and philotimia seem to be in the concupiscible part, while magnificence and magnanimity are in the irascible.

As regards man’s good in relation to other men, it does not seem hard to obtain, but is considered absolutely, as the object of the concupiscible passions.  This good may be pleasurable to a man in his behavior towards another either in some serious matter, in actions, to wit, that are directed by reason to a due end, or in playful actions, viz. that are done for mere pleasure, and which do not stand in the same relation to reason as the former.  Now one man behaves towards another in serious matters, in two ways.  First, as being pleasant in his regard, by becoming speech and deeds:  and this belongs to a virtue which Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) calls “friendship”