Reply Obj. 2:  That justice which seeks the common good is another virtue from that which is directed to the private good of an individual:  wherefore common right differs from private right; and Tully (De Inv. ii) reckons as a special virtue, piety which directs man to the good of his country.  But that justice which directs man to the common good is a general virtue through its act of command:  since it directs all the acts of the virtues to its own end, viz. the common good.  And the virtues, in so far as they are commanded by that justice, receive the name of justice:  so that virtue does not differ, save logically, from legal justice; just as there is only a logical difference between a virtue that is active of itself, and a virtue that is active through the command of another virtue.

Reply Obj. 3:  There is the same kind of due in all the operations belonging to special justice.  Consequently, there is the same virtue of justice, especially in regard to commutations.  For it may be that distributive justice is of another species from commutative justice; but about this we shall inquire later on (II-II, Q. 61, A. 1). ________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 60, Art. 4]

Whether There Are Different Moral Virtues About Different Passions?

Objection 1:  It would seem that there are not different moral virtues about different passions.  For there is but one habit about things that concur in their source and end:  as is evident especially in the case of sciences.  But the passions all concur in one source, viz. love; and they all terminate in the same end, viz. joy or sorrow, as we stated above (Q. 25, AA. 1, 2, 4; Q. 27, A. 4).  Therefore there is but one moral virtue about all the passions.

Obj. 2:  Further, if there were different moral virtues about different passions, it would follow that there are as many moral virtues as passions.  But this clearly is not the case:  since there is one moral virtue about contrary passions; namely, fortitude, about fear and daring; temperance, about pleasure and sorrow.  Therefore there is no need for different moral virtues about different passions.

Obj. 3:  Further, love, desire, and pleasure are passions of different species, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4).  Now there is but one virtue about all these three, viz. temperance.  Therefore there are not different moral virtues about different passions.

On the contrary, Fortitude is about fear and daring; temperance about desire; meekness about anger; as stated in Ethic. iii, 6, 10; iv, 5.

I answer that, It cannot be said that there is only one moral virtue about all the passions:  since some passions are not in the same power as other passions; for some belong to the irascible, others to the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1).