effect of fire is of necessity something in the species of fire.  Sometimes, however, the matter receives the form from the agent, but not in the same kind specifically as the agent, as is the case with non-univocal causes of generation:  thus an animal is generated by the sun.  In this case the forms received into matter are not of one species, but vary according to the adaptability of the matter to receive the influx of the agent:  for instance, we see that owing to the one action of the sun, animals of various species are produced by putrefaction according to the various adaptability of matter.

Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of commander and mover, while the appetitive power is commanded and moved.  But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason univocally so to say; because it is rational, not essentially, but by participation (Ethic. i, 13).  Consequently objects made appetible by the direction of reason belong to various species, according to their various relations to reason:  so that it follows that moral virtues are of various species and are not one only.

Reply Obj. 1:  The object of the reason is truth.  Now in all moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one kind of truth.  Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters, viz. prudence.  On the other hand, the object of the appetitive power is the appetible good, which varies in kind according to its various relations to reason, the directing power.

Reply Obj. 2:  This formal element is one generically, on account of the unity of the agent:  but it varies in species, on account of the various relations of the receiving matter, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 3:  Moral matters do not receive their species from the last end, but from their proximate ends:  and these, although they be infinite in number, are not infinite in species. ________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 60, Art. 2]

Whether Moral Virtues About Operations Are Different from Those That
Are About Passions?

Objection 1:  It would seem that moral virtues are not divided into those which are about operations and those which are about passions.  For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that moral virtue is “an operative habit whereby we do what is best in matters of pleasure or sorrow.”  Now pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 1; Q. 35, A. 1).  Therefore the same virtue which is about passions is also about operations, since it is an operative habit.

Obj. 2:  Further, the passions are principles of external action.  If therefore some virtues regulate the passions, they must, as a consequence, regulate operations also.  Therefore the same moral virtues are about both passions and operations.

Obj. 3:  Further, the sensitive appetite is moved well or ill towards every external operation.  Now movements of the sensitive appetite are passions.  Therefore the same virtues that are about operations are also about passions.