QUESTION 60

HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider how the moral virtues differ from one another:  under which head there are five points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether there is only one moral virtue?

(2) Whether those moral virtues which are about operations, are distinct from those which are about passions?

(3) Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations?

(4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?

(5) Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions? ________________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 60, Art. 1]

Whether There Is Only One Moral Virtue?

Objection 1:  It would seem that there is only one moral virtue.  Because just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason which is the subject of the intellectual virtues; so does their inclination belong to the appetite which is the subject of moral virtues.  But there is only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz. prudence.  Therefore there is also but one moral virtue to give all moral acts their respective inclinations.

Obj. 2:  Further, habits differ, not in respect of their material objects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects.  Now the formal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed, is one thing, viz. the mean defined by reason.  Therefore, seemingly, there is but one moral virtue.

Obj. 3:  Further, things pertaining to morals are specified by their end, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 3).  Now there is but one common end of all moral virtues, viz. happiness, while the proper and proximate ends are infinite in number.  But the moral virtues themselves are not infinite in number.  Therefore it seems that there is but one.

On the contrary, One habit cannot be in several powers, as stated above (Q. 56, A. 2).  But the subject of the moral virtues is the appetitive part of the soul, which is divided into several powers, as stated in the First Part (Q. 80, A. 2; Q. 81, A. 2).  Therefore there cannot be only one moral virtue.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 58, AA. 1, 2, 3), the moral virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty.  Now habits differ specifically according to the specific differences of their objects, as stated above (Q. 54, A. 2).  Again, the species of the object of appetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it receives from the agent.  But we must observe that the matter of the passive subject bears a twofold relation to the agent.  For sometimes it receives the form of the agent, in the same kind specifically as the agent has that form, as happens with all univocal agents, so that if the agent be one specifically, the matter must of necessity receive a form specifically one:  thus the univocal