Accordingly, if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he consent to them deliberately; as the Stoics maintained.  But if the passions be taken for any movements of the sensitive appetite, they can be in a virtuous man, in so far as they are subordinate to reason.  Hence Aristotle says (Ethic. ii, 3) that “some describe virtue as being a kind of freedom from passion and disturbance; this is incorrect, because the assertion should be qualified”:  they should have said virtue is freedom from those passions “that are not as they should be as to manner and time.”

Reply Obj. 1:  The Philosopher quotes this, as well as many other examples in his books on Logic, in order to illustrate, not his own mind, but that of others.  It was the opinion of the Stoics that the passions of the soul were incompatible with virtue:  and the Philosopher rejects this opinion (Ethic. ii, 3), when he says that virtue is not freedom from passion.  It may be said, however, that when he says “a gentle man is not passionate,” we are to understand this of inordinate passion.

Reply Obj. 2:  This and all similar arguments which Tully brings forward in De Tusc.  Quaest. iv take the passions in the execution of reason’s command.

Reply Obj. 3:  When a passion forestalls the judgment of reason, so as to prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel and the judgment of reason.  But when it follows that judgment, as through being commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution of reason’s command. ________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 59, Art. 3]

Whether Sorrow Is Compatible with Moral Virtue?

Objection 1:  It would seem that sorrow is incompatible with virtue.  Because the virtues are effects of wisdom, according to Wis. 8:7:  “She,” i.e.  Divine wisdom, “teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude.”  Now the “conversation” of wisdom “hath no bitterness,” as we read further on (verse 16).  Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue also.

Obj. 2:  Further, sorrow is a hindrance to work, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 13; x, 5).  But a hindrance to good works is incompatible with virtue.  Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue.

Obj. 3:  Further, Tully calls sorrow a disease of the mind (De Tusc.  Quaest. iv).  But disease of the mind is incompatible with virtue, which is a good condition of the mind.  Therefore sorrow is opposed to virtue and is incompatible with it.

On the contrary, Christ was perfect in virtue.  But there was sorrow in Him, for He said (Matt. 26:38):  “My soul is sorrowful even unto death.”  Therefore sorrow is compatible with virtue.

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ.  Dei xiv, 8), the Stoics held that in the mind of the wise man there are three eupatheiai, i.e. “three good passions,” in place of the three disturbances:  viz. instead of covetousness, “desire”; instead of mirth, “joy”; instead of fear, “caution.”  But they denied that anything corresponding to sorrow could be in the mind of a wise man, for two reasons.