only universal but also particular principles.  As to universal principles of action, man is rightly disposed by the natural understanding of principles, whereby he understands that he should do no evil; or again by some practical science.  But this is not enough in order that man may reason aright about particular cases.  For it happens sometimes that the aforesaid universal principle, known by means of understanding or science, is destroyed in a particular case by a passion:  thus to one who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the object of his desire seems good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his reason.  Consequently, as by the habit of natural understanding or of science, man is made to be rightly disposed in regard to the universal principles of action; so, in order that he be rightly disposed with regard to the particular principles of action, viz. the ends, he needs to be perfected by certain habits, whereby it becomes connatural, as it were, to man to judge aright to the end.  This is done by moral virtue:  for the virtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue, because “such a man is, such does the end seem to him” (Ethic. iii, 5).  Consequently the right reason about things to be done, viz. prudence, requires man to have moral virtue.

Reply Obj. 1:  Reason, as apprehending the end, precedes the appetite for the end:  but appetite for the end precedes the reason, as arguing about the choice of the means, which is the concern of prudence.  Even so, in speculative matters the understanding of principles is the foundation on which the syllogism of the reason is based.

Reply Obj. 2:  It does not depend on the disposition of our appetite whether we judge well or ill of the principles of art, as it does, when we judge of the end which is the principle in moral matters:  in the former case our judgment depends on reason alone.  Hence art does not require a virtue perfecting the appetite, as prudence does.

Reply Obj. 3:  Prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel, but also to judge and command well.  This is not possible unless the impediment of the passions, destroying the judgment and command of prudence, be removed; and this is done by moral virtue. ________________________

QUESTION 59

OF MORAL VIRTUE IN RELATION TO THE PASSIONS
(In Five Articles)

We must now consider the difference of one moral virtue from another.  And since those moral virtues which are about the passions, differ accordingly to the difference of passions, we must consider (1) the relation of virtue to passion; (2) the different kinds of moral virtue in relation to the passions.  Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether moral virtue is a passion?

(2) Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?

(3) Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?