Reply Obj. 2:  A man may be virtuous without having full use of reason as to everything, provided he have it with regard to those things which have to be done virtuously.  In this way all virtuous men have full use of reason.  Hence those who seem to be simple, through lack of worldly cunning, may possibly be prudent, according to Matt. 10:16:  “Be ye therefore prudent (Douay:  ‘wise’) as serpents, and simple as doves.”

Reply Obj. 3:  The natural inclination to a good of virtue is a kind of beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue.  For the stronger this inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be, unless it be accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice of fitting means towards the due end.  Thus if a running horse be blind, the faster it runs the more heavily will it fall, and the more grievously will it be hurt.  And consequently, although moral virtue be not right reason, as Socrates held, yet not only is it “according to right reason,” in so far as it inclines man to that which is, according to right reason, as the Platonists maintained [Cf.  Plato, Meno xli.]; but also it needs to be “joined with right reason,” as Aristotle declares (Ethic. vi, 13). ________________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 58, Art. 5]

Whether There Can Be Intellectual Without Moral Virtue?

Objection 1:  It would seem that there can be intellectual without moral virtue.  Because perfection of what precedes does not depend on the perfection of what follows.  Now reason precedes and moves the sensitive appetite.  Therefore intellectual virtue, which is a perfection of the reason, does not depend on moral virtue, which is a perfection of the appetitive faculty; and can be without it.

Obj. 2:  Further, morals are the matter of prudence, even as things makeable are the matter of art.  Now art can be without its proper matter, as a smith without iron.  Therefore prudence can be without the moral virtues, although of all the intellectual virtues, it seems most akin to the moral virtues.

Obj. 3:  Further, prudence is “a virtue whereby we are of good counsel” (Ethic. vi, 9).  Now many are of good counsel without having the moral virtues.  Therefore prudence can be without a moral virtue.

On the contrary, To wish to do evil is directly opposed to moral virtue; and yet it is not opposed to anything that can be without moral virtue.  Now it is contrary to prudence “to sin willingly” (Ethic. vi, 5).  Therefore prudence cannot be without moral virtue.

I answer that, Other intellectual virtues can, but prudence cannot, be without moral virtue.  The reason for this is that prudence is the right reason about things to be done (and this, not merely in general, but also in particular); about which things actions are.  Now right reason demands principles from which reason proceeds to argue.  And when reason argues about particular cases, it needs not