bereft of the vision of the Divine Essence, we are not present to the Lord.  But the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, are in God’s presence; wherefore the text continues:  “But we are confident and have a good will to be absent . . . from the body, and to be present with the Lord.”  Whence it is evident that the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, “walk by sight,” seeing the Essence of God, wherein is true Happiness.

Again this is made clear by reason.  For the intellect needs not the body, for its operation, save on account of the phantasms, wherein it looks on the intelligible truth, as stated in the First Part (Q. 84, A. 7).  Now it is evident that the Divine Essence cannot be seen by means of phantasms, as stated in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 3).  Wherefore, since man’s perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, it does not depend on the body.  Consequently, without the body the soul can be happy.

We must, however, notice that something may belong to a thing’s perfection in two ways.  First, as constituting the essence thereof; thus the soul is necessary for man’s perfection.  Secondly, as necessary for its well-being:  thus, beauty of body and keenness of perfection belong to man’s perfection.  Wherefore though the body does not belong in the first way to the perfection of human Happiness, yet it does in the second way.  For since operation depends on a thing’s nature, the more perfect is the soul in its nature, the more perfectly it has its proper operation, wherein its happiness consists.  Hence, Augustine, after inquiring (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) “whether that perfect Happiness can be ascribed to the souls of the dead separated from their bodies,” answers “that they cannot see the Unchangeable Substance, as the blessed angels see It; either for some other more hidden reason, or because they have a natural desire to rule the body.”

Reply Obj. 1:  Happiness is the perfection of the soul on the part of the intellect, in respect of which the soul transcends the organs of the body; but not according as the soul is the natural form of the body.  Wherefore the soul retains that natural perfection in respect of which happiness is due to it, though it does not retain that natural perfection in respect of which it is the form of the body.

Reply Obj. 2:  The relation of the soul to being is not the same as that of other parts:  for the being of the whole is not that of any individual part:  wherefore, either the part ceases altogether to be, when the whole is destroyed, just as the parts of an animal, when the animal is destroyed; or, if they remain, they have another actual being, just as a part of a line has another being from that of the whole line.  But the human soul retains the being of the composite after the destruction of the body:  and this because the being of the form is the same as that of its matter, and this is the being of the composite.  Now the soul subsists in its own being, as stated in the First Part (Q. 75, A. 2).  It follows, therefore, that after being separated from the body it has perfect being and that consequently it can have a perfect operation; although it has not the perfect specific nature.