Reply Obj. 3:  Judgment of anything should be based on that thing’s proper principles.  But inquiry does not reach to the proper principles:  because, if we were in possession of these, we should need no more to inquire, the truth would be already discovered.  Hence only one virtue is directed to being of good counsel, wheres there are two virtues for good judgment:  because difference is based not on common but on proper principles.  Consequently, even in speculative matters, there is one science of dialectics, which inquires about all matters; whereas demonstrative sciences, which pronounce judgment, differ according to their different objects. Synesis and gnome differ in respect of the different rules on which judgment is based:  for synesis judges of actions according to the common law; while gnome bases its judgment on the natural law, in those cases where the common law fails to apply, as we shall explain further on (II-II, Q. 51, A. 4).

Reply Obj. 4:  Memory, understanding and foresight, as also caution and docility and the like, are not virtues distinct from prudence:  but are, as it were, integral parts thereof, in so far as they are all requisite for perfect prudence.  There are, moreover, subjective parts or species of prudence, e.g. domestic and political economy, and the like.  But the three first names are, in a fashion, potential parts of prudence; because they are subordinate thereto, as secondary virtues to a principal virtue:  and we shall speak of them later (II-II, Q. 48, seqq.). ________________________

QUESTION 58

OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (In Five Articles)

We must now consider moral virtues.  We shall speak (1) of the difference between them and intellectual virtues; (2) of their distinction, one from another, in respect of their proper matter; (3) of the difference between the chief or cardinal virtues and the others.

Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?

(2) Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?

(3) Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual virtue?

(4) Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?

(5) Whether, on the other hand, there can be intellectual without moral virtue? ________________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 58, Art. 1]

Whether Every Virtue Is a Moral Virtue?

Objection 1:  It would seem that every virtue is a moral virtue. 
Because moral virtue is so called from the Latin mos, i.e. custom. 
Now, we can accustom ourselves to the acts of all the virtues. 
Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.

Obj. 2:  Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that moral virtue is “a habit of choosing the rational mean.”  But every virtue is a habit of choosing:  since the acts of any virtue can be done from choice.  And, moreover, every virtue consists in following the rational mean in some way, as we shall explain further on (Q. 64, AA. 1, 2, 3).  Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.