Now the proper nature of a power is seen in its relation to its object.  Since, therefore, as we have said above (Q. 19, A. 3), the object of the will is the good of reason proportionate to the will, in respect of this the will does not need a virtue perfecting it.  But if man’s will is confronted with a good that exceeds its capacity, whether as regards the whole human species, such as Divine good, which transcends the limits of human nature, or as regards the individual, such as the good of one’s neighbor, then does the will need virtue.  And therefore such virtues as those which direct man’s affections to God or to his neighbor are subjected in the will, as charity, justice, and such like.

Reply Obj. 1:  This objection is true of those virtues which are ordained to the willer’s own good; such as temperance and fortitude, which are concerned with the human passions, and the like, as is clear from what we have said (Q. 35, A. 6).

Reply Obj. 2:  Not only the irascible and concupiscible powers are rational by participation but “the appetitive power altogether,” i.e. in its entirety (Ethic. i, 13).  Now the will is included in the appetitive power.  And therefore whatever virtue is in the will must be a moral virtue, unless it be theological, as we shall see later on (Q. 62, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 3:  Some virtues are directed to the good of moderated passion, which is the proper good of this or that man:  and in these cases there is no need for virtue in the will, for the nature of the power suffices for the purpose, as we have said.  This need exists only in the case of virtues which are directed to some extrinsic good. ________________________

QUESTION 57

OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES
(In Six Articles)

We now have to consider the various kinds of virtue:  and (1) the intellectual virtues; (2) the moral virtues; (3) the theological virtues.  Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether habits of the speculative intellect are virtues?

(2) Whether they are three, namely, wisdom, science and understanding?

(3) Whether the intellectual habit, which is art, is a virtue?

(4) Whether prudence is a virtue distinct from art?

(5) Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?

(6) Whether “eubulia,” “synesis” and “gnome” are virtues annexed to prudence? ________________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 57, Art. 1]

Whether the Habits of the Speculative Intellect Are Virtues?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues.  For virtue is an operative habit, as we have said above (Q. 55, A. 2).  But speculative habits are not operative:  for speculative matter is distinct from practical, i.e. operative matter.  Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues.