Reply Obj. 3:  This objection considers virtue simply so called.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 56, Art. 4]

Whether the Irascible and Concupiscible Powers Are the Subject of
Virtue?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible powers cannot be the subject of virtue.  For these powers are common to us and dumb animals.  But we are now speaking of virtue as proper to man, since for this reason it is called human virtue.  It is therefore impossible for human virtue to be in the irascible and concupiscible powers which are parts of the sensitive appetite, as we have said in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2).

Obj. 2:  Further, the sensitive appetite is a power which makes use of a corporeal organ.  But the good of virtue cannot be in man’s body:  for the Apostle says (Rom. 7):  “I know that good does not dwell in my flesh.”  Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot be the subject of virtue.

Obj. 3:  Further, Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. v) that virtue is not in the body but in the soul, for the reason that the body is ruled by the soul:  wherefore it is entirely due to his soul that a man make good use of his body:  “For instance, if my coachman, through obedience to my orders, guides well the horses which he is driving; this is all due to me.”  But just as the soul rules the body, so also does the reason rule the sensitive appetite.  Therefore that the irascible and concupiscible powers are rightly ruled, is entirely due to the rational powers.  Now “virtue is that by which we live rightly,” as we have said above (Q. 55, A. 4).  Therefore virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but only in the rational powers.

Obj. 4:  Further, “the principal act of moral virtue is choice” (Ethic. viii, 13).  Now choice is not an act of the irascible and concupiscible powers, but of the rational power, as we have said above (Q. 13, A. 2).  Therefore moral virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but in the reason.

On the contrary, Fortitude is assigned to the irascible power, and temperance to the concupiscible power.  Whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 10) says that “these virtues belong to the irrational part of the soul.”

I answer that, The irascible and concupiscible powers can be considered in two ways.  First, in themselves, in so far as they are parts of the sensitive appetite:  and in this way they are not competent to be the subject of virtue.  Secondly, they can be considered as participating in the reason, from the fact that they have a natural aptitude to obey reason.  And thus the irascible or concupiscible power can be the subject of human virtue:  for, in so far as it participates in the reason, it is the principle of a human act.  And to these powers we must needs assign virtues.