I answer that, Since Happiness consists in gaining the last end, those things that are required for Happiness must be gathered from the way in which man is ordered to an end.  Now man is ordered to an intelligible end partly through his intellect, and partly through his will:  through his intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect knowledge of the end pre-exists in the intellect:  through the will, first by love which is the will’s first movement towards anything; secondly, by a real relation of the lover to the thing beloved, which relation may be threefold.  For sometimes the thing beloved is present to the lover:  and then it is no longer sought for.  Sometimes it is not present, and it is impossible to attain it:  and then, too, it is not sought for.  But sometimes it is possible to attain it, yet it is raised above the capability of the attainer, so that he cannot have it forthwith; and this is the relation of one that hopes, to that which he hopes for, and this relation alone causes a search for the end.  To these three, there are a corresponding three in Happiness itself.  For perfect knowledge of the end corresponds to imperfect knowledge; presence of the end corresponds to the relation of hope; but delight in the end now present results from love, as already stated (A. 2, ad 3).  And therefore these three must concur with Happiness; to wit, vision, which is perfect knowledge of the intelligible end; comprehension, which implies presence of the end; and delight or enjoyment, which implies repose of the lover in the object beloved.

Reply Obj. 1:  Comprehension is twofold.  First, inclusion of the comprehended in the comprehensor; and thus whatever is comprehended by the finite, is itself finite.  Wherefore God cannot be thus comprehended by a created intellect.  Secondly, comprehension means nothing but the holding of something already present and possessed:  thus one who runs after another is said to comprehend [In English we should say ‘catch.’] him when he lays hold on him.  And in this sense comprehension is necessary for Happiness.

Reply Obj. 2:  Just as hope and love pertain to the will, because it is the same one that loves a thing, and that tends towards it while not possessed, so, too, comprehension and delight belong to the will, since it is the same that possesses a thing and reposes therein.

Reply Obj. 3:  Comprehension is not a distinct operation from vision; but a certain relation to the end already gained.  Wherefore even vision itself, or the thing seen, inasmuch as it is present, is the object of comprehension. ________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 4, Art. 4]

Whether Rectitude of the Will Is Necessary for Happiness?

Objection 1:  It would seem that rectitude of the will is not necessary for Happiness.  For Happiness consists essentially in an operation of the intellect, as stated above (Q. 3, A. 4).  But rectitude of the will, by reason of which men are said to be clean of heart, is not necessary for the perfect operation of the intellect:  for Augustine says (Retract. i, 4) “I do not approve of what I said in a prayer:  O God, Who didst will none but the clean of heart to know the truth.  For it can be answered that many who are not clean of heart, know many truths.”  Therefore rectitude of the will is not necessary for Happiness.