Now this opinion contains some truth, and some error.  For it is manifest from what we have said (Q. 49, A. 4) that only a being in potentiality is the subject of habit.  So the above-mentioned commentators considered that angels are immaterial substances, and that there is no material potentiality in them, and on that account, excluded from them habit and any kind of accident.  Yet since though there is no material potentiality in angels, there is still some potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs to God alone), therefore, as far as potentiality is found to be in them, so far may habits be found in them.  But because the potentiality of matter and the potentiality of intellectual substance are not of the same kind.  Whence, Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Predicaments that:  “The habits of the intellectual substance are not like the habits here below, but rather are they like simple and immaterial images which it contains in itself.”

However, the angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with regard to this habit.  For the human intellect, being the lowest in the intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all intelligible things, just as primal matter is in respect of all sensible forms; and therefore for the understanding of all things, it needs some habit.  But the angelic intellect is not as a pure potentiality in the order of intelligible things, but as an act; not indeed as pure act (for this belongs to God alone), but with an admixture of some potentiality:  and the higher it is, the less potentiality it has.  And therefore, as we said in the First Part (Q. 55, A. 1), so far as it is in potentiality, so far is it in need of habitual perfection by means of intelligible species in regard to its proper operation:  but so far as it is in act, through its own essence it can understand some things, at least itself, and other things according to the mode of its substance, as stated in De Causis: and the more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it understand.

But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order to attain to God Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some habits, being as it were in potentiality in regard to that Pure Act.  Wherefore Dionysius says (Coel.  Hier. vii) that their habits are “godlike,” that is to say, that by them they are made like to God.

But those habits that are dispositions to the natural being are not in angels, since they are immaterial.

Reply Obj. 1:  This saying of Maximus must be understood of material habits and accidents.

Reply Obj. 2:  As to that which belongs to angels by their essence, they do not need a habit.  But as they are not so far beings of themselves, as not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness, therefore, so far as they need to partake of something from without, so far do they need to have habits.