On the other hand, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the Predicaments, Alexander denied absolutely that habits or dispositions of the first species are in the body:  and held that the first species of quality belonged to the soul alone.  And he held that Aristotle mentions health and sickness in the Book on the Predicaments not as though they belonged to the first species of quality, but by way of example:  so that he would mean that just as health and sickness may be easy or difficult to change, so also are all the qualities of the first species, which are called habits and dispositions.  But this is clearly contrary to the intention of Aristotle:  both because he speaks in the same way of health and sickness as examples, as of virtue and science; and because in Phys. vii, text. 17, he expressly mentions beauty and health among habits.

Reply Obj. 1:  This objection runs in the sense of habit as a disposition to operation, and of those actions of the body which are from nature:  but not in the sense of those actions which proceed from the soul, and the principle of which is the will.

Reply Obj. 2:  Bodily dispositions are not simply difficult to change on account of the changeableness of their bodily causes.  But they may be difficult to change by comparison to such a subject, because, to wit, as long as such a subject endures, they cannot be removed; or because they are difficult to change, by comparison to other dispositions.  But qualities of the soul are simply difficult to change, on account of the unchangeableness of the subject.  And therefore he does not say that health which is difficult to change is a habit simply:  but that it is “as a habit,” as we read in the Greek [*_isos hexin_ (Categor. viii)].  On the other hand, the qualities of the soul are called habits simply.

Reply Obj. 3:  Bodily dispositions which are in the first species of quality, as some maintained, differ from qualities of the third species, in this, that the qualities of the third species consist in some “becoming” and movement, as it were, wherefore they are called passions or passible qualities.  But when they have attained to perfection (specific perfection, so to speak), they have then passed into the first species of quality.  But Simplicius in his Commentary disapproves of this; for in this way heating would be in the third species, and heat in the first species of quality; whereas Aristotle puts heat in the third.

Wherefore Porphyrius, as Simplicius reports (Commentary), says that passion or passion-like quality, disposition and habit, differ in bodies by way of intensity and remissness.  For when a thing receives heat in this only that it is being heated, and not so as to be able to give heat, then we have passion, if it is transitory; or passion-like quality if it is permanent.  But when it has been brought to the point that it is able to heat something else, then it is a disposition;