Reply Obj. 2:  As stated above (Q. 1, A. 8), the end has a twofold acceptation.  First, as to the thing itself which is desired:  and in this way, the same thing is the end of the higher and of the lower nature, and indeed of all things, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 8).  Secondly, as to the attainment of this thing; and thus the end of the higher nature is different from that of the lower, according to their respective habitudes to that thing.  So then in the happiness of God, Who, in understanding his Essence, comprehends It, is higher than that of a man or angel who sees It indeed, but comprehends It not. ________________________

QUESTION 4

OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS
(In Eight Articles)

We have now to consider those things that are required for happiness:  and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether delight is required for happiness?

(2) Which is of greater account in happiness, delight or vision?

(3) Whether comprehension is required?

(4) Whether rectitude of the will is required?

(5) Whether the body is necessary for man’s happiness?

(6) Whether any perfection of the body is necessary?

(7) Whether any external goods are necessary?

(8) Whether the fellowship of friends is necessary?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 4, Art. 1]

Whether Delight Is Required for Happiness?

Objection 1:  It would seem that delight is not required for happiness.  For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that “vision is the entire reward of faith.”  But the prize or reward of virtue is happiness, as the Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. i, 9).  Therefore nothing besides vision is required for happiness.

Obj. 2:  Further, happiness is “the most self-sufficient of all goods,” as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7).  But that which needs something else is not self-sufficient.  Since then the essence of happiness consists in seeing God, as stated above (Q. 3, A. 8); it seems that delight is not necessary for happiness.

Obj. 3:  Further, the “operation of bliss or happiness should be unhindered” (Ethic. vii, 13).  But delight hinders the operation of the intellect:  since it destroys the estimate of prudence (Ethic. vi, 5).  Therefore delight is not necessary for happiness.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is “joy in truth.”

I answer that, One thing may be necessary for another in four ways.  First, as a preamble and preparation to it:  thus instruction is necessary for science.  Secondly, as perfecting it:  thus the soul is necessary for the life of the body.  Thirdly, as helping it from without:  thus friends are necessary for some undertaking.  Fourthly, as something attendant on it:  thus we might say that heat is necessary for fire.  And in this way delight is necessary for happiness.  For it is caused by the appetite being at rest in the good attained.  Wherefore, since happiness is nothing else but the attainment of the Sovereign Good, it cannot be without concomitant delight.