Nevertheless, the fervor arising from heat differs according as it is to be referred to love or to anger.  Because the fervor of love has a certain sweetness and gentleness; for it tends to the good that one loves:  whence it is likened to the warmth of the air and of the blood.  For this reason sanguine temperaments are more inclined to love; and hence the saying that “love springs from the liver,” because of the blood being formed there.  On the other hand, the fervor of anger has a certain bitterness with a tendency to destroy, for it seeks to be avenged on the contrary evil:  whence it is likened to the heat of fire and of the bile, and for this reason Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that it “results from an exhalation of the bile whence it takes its name chole.”

Reply Obj. 2:  Time, of necessity, weakens all those things, the causes of which are impaired by time.  Now it is evident that memory is weakened by time; for things which happened long ago easily slip from our memory.  But anger is caused by the memory of a wrong done.  Consequently the cause of anger is impaired little by little as time goes on, until at length it vanishes altogether.  Moreover a wrong seems greater when it is first felt; and our estimate thereof is gradually lessened the further the sense of present wrong recedes into the past.  The same applies to love, so long as the cause of love is in the memory alone; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that “if a friend’s absence lasts long, it seems to make men forget their friendship.”  But in the presence of a friend, the cause of friendship is continually being multiplied by time:  wherefore the friendship increases:  and the same would apply to anger, were its cause continually multiplied.

Nevertheless the very fact that anger soon spends itself proves the strength of its fervor:  for as a great fire is soon spent having burnt up all the fuel; so too anger, by reason of its vehemence, soon dies away.

Reply Obj. 3:  Every power that is divided in itself is weakened.  Consequently if a man being already angry with one, becomes angry with another, by this very fact his anger with the former is weakened.  Especially is this so if his anger in the second case be greater:  because the wrong done which aroused his former anger, will, in comparison with the second wrong, which is reckoned greater, seem to be of little or no account. ________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 48, Art. 3]

Whether Anger Above All Hinders the Use of Reason?

Objection 1:  It would seem that anger does not hinder the use of reason.  Because that which presupposes an act of reason, does not seem to hinder the use of reason.  But “anger listens to reason,” as stated in Ethic. vii, 6.  Therefore anger does not hinder reason.

Obj. 2:  Further, the more the reason is hindered, the less does a man show his thoughts.  But the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that “an angry man is not cunning but is open.”  Therefore anger does not seem to hinder the use of reason, as desire does; for desire is cunning, as he also states (Ethic. vii, 6.).