As to the intensity of the desire, anger excludes mercy more than hatred does; because the movement of anger is more impetuous, through the heating of the bile.  Hence the passage quoted continues:  “Who can bear the violence of one provoked?”

Reply Obj. 2:  As stated above, an angry man wishes evil to someone, in so far as this evil is a means of just vengeance.  Now vengeance is wrought by the infliction of a punishment:  and the nature of punishment consists in being contrary to the will, painful, and inflicted for some fault.  Consequently an angry man desires this, that the person whom he is hurting, may feel it and be in pain, and know that this has befallen him on account of the harm he has done the other.  The hater, on the other hand, cares not for all this, since he desires another’s evil as such.  It is not true, however, that an evil is worse through giving pain:  because “injustice and imprudence, although evil,” yet, being voluntary, “do not grieve those in whom they are,” as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 4).

Reply Obj. 3:  That which proceeds from several causes, is more settled when these causes are of one kind:  but it may be that one cause prevails over many others.  Now hatred ensues from a more lasting cause than anger does.  Because anger arises from an emotion of the soul due to the wrong inflicted; whereas hatred ensues from a disposition in a man, by reason of which he considers that which he hates to be contrary and hurtful to him.  Consequently, as passion is more transitory than disposition or habit, so anger is less lasting than hatred; although hatred itself is a passion ensuing from this disposition.  Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that “hatred is more incurable than anger.” ________________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 7]

Whether Anger Is Only Towards Those to Whom One Has an Obligation of
Justice?

Objection 1:  It would seem that anger is not only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice.  For there is no justice between man and irrational beings.  And yet sometimes one is angry with irrational beings; thus, out of anger, a writer throws away his pen, or a rider strikes his horse.  Therefore anger is not only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice.

Obj. 2:  Further, “there is no justice towards oneself . . . nor is there justice towards one’s own” (Ethic. v, 6).  But sometimes a man is angry with himself; for instance, a penitent, on account of his sin; hence it is written (Ps. 4:5):  “Be ye angry and sin not.”  Therefore anger is not only towards those with whom one has a relation of justice.

Obj. 3:  Further, justice and injustice can be of one man towards an entire class, or a whole community:  for instance, when the state injures an individual.  But anger is not towards a class but only towards an individual, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4).  Therefore properly speaking, anger is not towards those with whom one is in relation of justice or injustice.