SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 6]

Whether Anger Is More Grievous Than Hatred?

Objection 1:  It would seem that anger is more grievous than hatred.  For it is written (Prov. 27:4) that “anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth.”  But hatred sometimes has mercy.  Therefore anger is more grievous than hatred.

Obj. 2:  Further, it is worse to suffer evil and to grieve for it, than merely to suffer it.  But when a man hates, he is contented if the object of his hatred suffer evil:  whereas the angry man is not satisfied unless the object of his anger know it and be aggrieved thereby, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4).  Therefore, anger is more grievous than hatred.

Obj. 3:  Further, a thing seems to be so much the more firm according as more things concur to set it up:  thus a habit is all the more settled through being caused by several acts.  But anger is caused by the concurrence of several passions, as stated above (A. 1):  whereas hatred is not.  Therefore anger is more settled and more grievous than hatred.

On the contrary, Augustine, in his Rule, compares hatred to “a beam,” but anger to “a mote.”

I answer that, The species and nature of a passion are taken from its object.  Now the object of anger is the same in substance as the object of hatred; since, just as the hater wishes evil to him whom he hates, so does the angry man wish evil to him with whom he is angry.  But there is a difference of aspect:  for the hater wishes evil to his enemy, as evil, whereas the angry man wishes evil to him with whom he is angry, not as evil but in so far as it has an aspect of good, that is, in so far as he reckons it as just, since it is a means of vengeance.  Wherefore also it has been said above (A. 2) that hatred implies application of evil to evil, whereas anger denotes application of good to evil.  Now it is evident that to seek evil under the aspect of justice, is a lesser evil, than simply to seek evil to someone.  Because to wish evil to someone under the aspect of justice, may be according to the virtue of justice, if it be in conformity with the order of reason; and anger fails only in this, that it does not obey the precept of reason in taking vengeance.  Consequently it is evident that hatred is far worse and graver than anger.

Reply Obj. 1:  In anger and hatred two points may be considered:  namely, the thing desired, and the intensity of the desire.  As to the thing desired, anger has more mercy than hatred has.  For since hatred desires another’s evil for evil’s sake, it is satisfied with no particular measure of evil:  because those things that are desired for their own sake, are desired without measure, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3), instancing a miser with regard to riches.  Hence it is written (Ecclus. 12:16):  “An enemy . . . if he find an opportunity, will not be satisfied with blood.”  Anger, on the other hand, seeks evil only under the aspect of a just means of vengeance.  Consequently when the evil inflicted goes beyond the measure of justice according to the estimate of the angry man, then he has mercy.  Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that “the angry man is appeased if many evils befall, whereas the hater is never appeased.”