On the contrary, The concupiscible is distinct from the irascible faculty.  If, therefore, anger were in the concupiscible power, the irascible would not take its name from it.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 23, A. 1), the passions of the irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible faculty, in that the objects of the concupiscible passions are good and evil absolutely considered, whereas the objects of the irascible passions are good and evil in a certain elevation or arduousness.  Now it has been stated (A. 2) that anger regards two objects:  viz. the vengeance that it seeks; and the person on whom it seeks vengeance; and in respect of both, anger requires a certain arduousness:  for the movement of anger does not arise, unless there be some magnitude about both these objects; since “we make no ado about things that are naught or very minute,” as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 2).  It is therefore evident that anger is not in the concupiscible, but in the irascible faculty.

Reply Obj. 1:  Cicero gives the name of desire to any kind of craving for a future good, without discriminating between that which is arduous and that which is not.  Accordingly he reckons anger as a kind of desire, inasmuch as it is a desire of vengeance.  In this sense, however, desire is common to the irascible and concupiscible faculties.

Reply Obj. 2:  Anger is said to grow into hatred, not as though the same passion which at first was anger, afterwards becomes hatred by becoming inveterate; but by a process of causality.  For anger when it lasts a long time engenders hatred.

Reply Obj. 3:  Anger is said to be composed of sorrow and desire, not as though they were its parts, but because they are its causes:  and it has been said above (Q. 25, A. 2) that the concupiscible passions are the causes of the irascible passions. ________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 4]

Whether Anger Requires an Act of Reason?

Objection 1:  It would seem that anger does not require an act of reason.  For, since anger is a passion, it is in the sensitive appetite.  But the sensitive appetite follows an apprehension, not of reason, but of the sensitive faculty.  Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.

Obj. 2:  Further, dumb animals are devoid of reason:  and yet they are seen to be angry.  Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.

Obj. 3:  Further, drunkenness fetters the reason; whereas it is conducive to anger.  Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that “anger listens to reason somewhat.”

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), anger is a desire for vengeance.  Now vengeance implies a comparison between the punishment to be inflicted and the hurt done; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that “anger, as if it had drawn the inference that it ought to quarrel with such a person, is therefore immediately exasperated.”  Now to compare and to draw an inference is an act of reason.  Therefore anger, in a fashion, requires an act of reason.