Accordingly in the first way, anger is not a general passion but is condivided with the other passions, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4).  In like manner, neither is it in the second way:  since it is not a cause of the other passions.  But in this way, love may be called a general passion, as Augustine declares (De Civ.  Dei xiv, 7, 9), because love is the primary root of all the other passions, as stated above (Q. 27, A. 4).  But, in a third way, anger may be called a general passion, inasmuch as it is caused by a concurrence of several passions.  Because the movement of anger does not arise save on account of some pain inflicted, and unless there be desire and hope of revenge:  for, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2), “the angry man hopes to punish; since he craves for revenge as being possible.”  Consequently if the person, who inflicted the injury, excel very much, anger does not ensue, but only sorrow, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv, 6).

Reply Obj. 1:  The irascible power takes its name from “ira” (anger), not because every movement of that power is one of anger; but because all its movements terminate in anger; and because, of all these movements, anger is the most patent.

Reply Obj. 2:  From the very fact that anger is caused by contrary passions, i.e. by hope, which is of good, and by sorrow, which is of evil, it includes in itself contrariety:  and consequently it has no contrary outside itself.  Thus also in mixed colors there is no contrariety, except that of the simple colors from which they are made.

Reply Obj. 3:  Anger includes several passions, not indeed as a genus includes several species; but rather according to the inclusion of cause and effect. ________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 2]

Whether the Object of Anger Is Good or Evil?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the object of anger is evil.  For Gregory of Nyssa says [Nemesius, De Nat.  Hom. xxi.] that anger is “the sword-bearer of desire,” inasmuch, to wit, as it assails whatever obstacle stands in the way of desire.  But an obstacle has the character of evil.  Therefore anger regards evil as its object.

Obj. 2:  Further, anger and hatred agree in their effect, since each seeks to inflict harm on another.  But hatred regards evil as its object, as stated above (Q. 29, A. 1).  Therefore anger does also.

Obj. 3:  Further, anger arises from sorrow; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 6) that “anger acts with sorrow.”  But evil is the object of sorrow.  Therefore it is also the object of anger.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that “anger craves for revenge.”  But the desire for revenge is a desire for something good:  since revenge belongs to justice.  Therefore the object of anger is good.

Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, wherefore it causes pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2).  But the object of hope and of pleasure is good.  Therefore good is also the object of anger.