Reply Obj. 2:  The object of love is good simply, wherefore if it be increased, love is increased simply.  But the object of daring is a compound of good and evil; and the movement of daring towards evil presupposes the movement of hope towards good.  If, therefore, so much difficulty be added to the danger that it overcomes hope, the movement of daring does not ensue, but fails.  But if the movement of daring does ensue, the greater the danger, the greater is the daring considered to be.

Reply Obj. 3:  Hurt does not give rise to anger unless there be some kind of hope, as we shall see later on (Q. 46, A. 1).  Consequently if the danger be so great as to banish all hope of victory, anger does not ensue.  It is true, however, that if anger does ensue, there will be greater daring. ________________________

QUESTION 46

OF ANGER, IN ITSELF
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider anger:  and (1) anger in itself; (2) the cause of anger and its remedy; (3) the effect of anger.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether anger is a special passion?

(2) Whether the object of anger is good or evil?

(3) Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?

(4) Whether anger is accompanied by an act of reason?

(5) Whether anger is more natural than desire?

(6) Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?

(7) Whether anger is only towards those with whom we have a relation of justice?

(8) Of the species of anger.
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 1]

Whether Anger Is a Special Passion?

Objection 1:  It would seem that anger is not a special passion.  For the irascible power takes its name from anger (ira).  But there are several passions in this power, not only one.  Therefore anger is not one special passion.

Obj. 2:  Further, to every special passion there is a contrary passion; as is evident by going through them one by one.  But no passion is contrary to anger, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 3).  Therefore anger is not a special passion.

Obj. 3:  Further, one special passion does not include another.  But anger includes several passions:  since it accompanies sorrow, pleasure, and hope, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2).  Therefore anger is not a special passion.

On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) calls anger a special passion:  and so does Cicero (De Quaest.  Tusc. iv, 7).

I answer that, A thing is said to be general in two ways.  First, by predication; thus “animal” is general in respect of all animals.  Secondly, by causality; thus the sun is the general cause of all things generated here below, according to Dionysius (Div.  Nom. iv).  Because just as a genus contains potentially many differences, according to a likeness of matter; so an efficient cause contains many effects according to its active power.  Now it happens that an effect is produced by the concurrence of various causes; and since every cause remains somewhat in its effect, we may say that, in yet a third way, an effect which is due to the concurrence of several causes, has a certain generality, inasmuch as several causes are, in a fashion, actually existing therein.