Now that which is by reason of something else, follows that which is by reason of itself.  Consequently pursuit of evil follows pursuit of good; and avoidance of good follows avoidance of evil.  Now these four things belong to four passions, since pursuit of good belongs to hope, avoidance of evil to fear, the pursuit of the fearful evil belongs to daring, and the avoidance of good to despair.  It follows, therefore, that daring results from hope; since it is in the hope of overcoming the threatening object of fear, that one attacks it boldly.  But despair results from fear:  since the reason why a man despairs is because he fears the difficulty attaching to the good he should hope for.

Reply Obj. 1:  This argument would hold, if good and evil were not co-ordinate objects.  But because evil has a certain relation to good, since it comes after good, as privation comes after habit; consequently daring which pursues evil, comes after hope which pursues good.

Reply Obj. 2:  Although good, absolutely speaking, is prior to evil, yet avoidance of evil precedes avoidance of good; just as the pursuit of good precedes the pursuit of evil.  Consequently just as hope precedes daring, so fear precedes despair.  And just as fear does not always lead to despair, but only when it is intense; so hope does not always lead to daring, save only when it is strong.

Reply Obj. 3:  Although the object of daring is an evil to which, in the estimation of the daring man, the good of victory is conjoined; yet daring regards the evil, and hope regards the conjoined good.  In like manner despair regards directly the good which it turns away from, while fear regards the conjoined evil.  Hence, properly speaking, daring is not a part of hope, but its effect:  just as despair is an effect, not a part, of fear.  For this reason, too, daring cannot be a principal passion. ________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 45, Art. 3]

Whether Some Defect Is a Cause of Daring?

Objection 1:  It would seem that some defect is a cause of daring.  For the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 4) that “lovers of wine are strong and daring.”  But from wine ensues the effect of drunkenness.  Therefore daring is caused by a defect.

Obj. 2:  Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that “those who have no experience of danger are bold.”  But want of experience is a defect.  Therefore daring is caused by a defect.

Obj. 3:  Further, those who have suffered wrongs are wont to be daring; “like the beasts when beaten,” as stated in Ethic. iii, 5.  But the suffering of wrongs pertains to defect.  Therefore daring is caused by a defect.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that the cause of daring “is the presence in the imagination of the hope that the means of safety are nigh, and that the things to be feared are either non-existent or far off.”  But anything pertaining to defect implies either the removal of the means of safety, or the proximity of something to be feared.  Therefore nothing pertaining to defect is a cause of daring.