Reply Obj. 1:  Anger, daring and all the names of the passions can be taken in two ways.  First, as denoting absolutely movements of the sensitive appetite in respect of some object, good or bad:  and thus they are names of passions.  Secondly, as denoting besides this movement, a straying from the order of reason:  and thus they are names of vices.  It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of daring:  but we are speaking of it in the first sense.

Reply Obj. 2:  To one thing, in the same respect, there are not several contraries; but in different respects nothing prevents one thing having several contraries.  Accordingly it has been said above (Q. 23, A. 2; Q. 40, A. 4) that the irascible passions admit of a twofold contrariety:  one, according to the opposition of good and evil, and thus fear is contrary to hope:  the other, according to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, and thus daring is contrary to fear, and despair contrary to hope.

Reply Obj. 3:  Safety does not denote something contrary to fear, but merely the exclusion of fear:  for he is said to be safe, who fears not.  Wherefore safety is opposed to fear, as a privation:  while daring is opposed thereto as a contrary.  And as contrariety implies privation, so daring implies safety. ________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 45, Art. 2]

Whether Daring Ensues from Hope?

Objection 1:  It would seem that daring does not ensue from hope.  Because daring regards evil and fearful things, as stated in Ethic. iii, 7.  But hope regards good things, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 1).  Therefore they have different objects and are not in the same order.  Therefore daring does not ensue from hope.

Obj. 2:  Further, just as daring is contrary to fear, so is despair contrary to hope.  But fear does not ensue from despair:  in fact, despair excludes fear, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5).  Therefore daring does not result from hope.

Obj. 3:  Further, daring is intent on something good, viz. victory.  But it belongs to hope to tend to that which is good and difficult.  Therefore daring is the same as hope; and consequently does not result from it.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that “those are hopeful are full of daring.”  Therefore it seems that daring ensues from hope.

I answer that, As we have often stated (Q. 22, A. 2; Q. 35, A. 1; Q. 41, A. 1), all these passions belong to the appetitive power.  Now every movement of the appetitive power is reducible to one either of pursuit or of avoidance.  Again, pursuit or avoidance is of something either by reason of itself or by reason of something else.  By reason of itself, good is the object of pursuit, and evil, the object of avoidance:  but by reason of something else, evil can be the object of pursuit, through some good attaching to it; and good can be the object of avoidance, through some evil attaching to it.