Reply Obj. 2:  To everyone that is in pain, whether man or animal, it is natural to use all possible means of repelling the harmful thing that causes pain but its presence:  thus we observe that animals, when in pain, attack with their jaws or with their horns.  Now the greatest help for all purposes, in animals, is heat and vital spirits:  wherefore when they are in pain, their nature stores up the heat and vital spirits within them, in order to make use thereof in repelling the harmful object.  Hence the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 9) when the vital spirits and heat are concentrated together within, they require to find a vent in the voice:  for which reason those who are in pain can scarcely refrain from crying aloud.  On the other hand, in those who are afraid, the internal heat and vital spirits move from the heart downwards, as stated above (ad 1):  wherefore fear hinders speech which ensues from the emission of the vital spirits in an upward direction through the mouth:  the result being that fear makes its subject speechless.  For this reason, too, fear “makes its subject tremble,” as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 1, 6, 7).

Reply Obj. 3:  Mortal perils are contrary not only to the appetite of the soul, but also to nature.  Consequently in such like fear, there is contraction not only in the appetite, but also in the corporeal nature:  for when an animal is moved by the imagination of death, it experiences a contraction of heat towards the inner parts of the body, as though it were threatened by a natural death.  Hence it is that “those who are in fear of death turn pale” (Ethic. iv, 9).  But the evil that shame fears, is contrary, not to nature, but only to the appetite of the soul.  Consequently there results a contraction in this appetite, but not in the corporeal nature; in fact, the soul, as though contracted in itself, is free to set the vital spirits and heat in movement, so that they spread to the outward parts of the body:  the result being that those who are ashamed blush. ________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 44, Art. 2]

Whether Fear Makes One Suitable for Counsel?

Objection 1:  It would seem that fear does not make one suitable for counsel.  For the same thing cannot be conducive to counsel, and a hindrance thereto.  But fear hinders counsel:  because every passion disturbs repose, which is requisite for the good use of reason.  Therefore fear does not make a man suitable for counsel.

Obj. 2:  Further, counsel is an act of reason, in thinking and deliberating about the future.  But a certain fear “drives away all thought, and dislocates the mind,” as Cicero observes (De Quaest.  Tusc. iv, 8).  Therefore fear does not conduce to counsel, but hinders it.

Obj. 3:  Further, just as we have recourse to counsel in order to avoid evil, so do we, in order to attain good things.  But whereas fear is of evil to be avoided, so is hope of good things to be obtained.  Therefore fear is not more conducive to counsel, than hope is.