Reply Obj. 1:  Separation from God is a punishment resulting from sin:  and every punishment is, in some way, due to an extrinsic cause.

Reply Obj. 2:  Sorrow and fear agree in one point, since each regards evil:  they differ, however, in two points.  First, because sorrow is about present evil, whereas fear is future evil.  Secondly, because sorrow, being in the concupiscible faculty, regards evil absolutely; wherefore it can be about any evil, great or small; whereas fear, being in the irascible part, regards evil with the addition of a certain arduousness or difficulty; which difficulty ceases in so far as a thing is subject to the will.  Consequently not all things that give us pain when they are present, make us fear when they are yet to come, but only some things, namely, those that are difficult.

Reply Obj. 3:  Hope is of good that is obtainable.  Now one may obtain a good either of oneself, or through another:  and so, hope may be of an act of virtue, which lies within our own power.  On the other hand, fear is of an evil that does not lie in our own power:  and consequently the evil which is feared is always from an extrinsic cause; while the good that is hoped for may be both from an intrinsic and from an extrinsic cause.

Reply Obj. 4:  As stated above (Q. 41, A. 4, ad 2, 3), shame is not fear of the very act of sin, but of the disgrace or ignominy which arises therefrom, and which is due to an extrinsic cause. ________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 42, Art. 4]

Whether Fear Itself Can Be Feared?

Objection 1:  It would seem that fear cannot be feared.  For whatever is feared, is prevented from being lost, through fear thereof:  thus a man who fears to lose his health, keeps it, through fearing its loss.  If therefore a man be afraid of fear, he will keep himself from fear by being afraid:  which seems absurd.

Obj. 2:  Further, fear is a kind of flight.  But nothing flies from itself.  Therefore fear cannot be the object of fear.

Obj. 3:  Further, fear is about the future.  But fear is present to him that fears.  Therefore it cannot be the object of his fear.

On the contrary, A man can love his own love, and can grieve at his own sorrow.  Therefore, in like manner, he can fear his own fear.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), nothing can be an object of fear, save what is due to an extrinsic cause; but not that which ensues from our own will.  Now fear partly arises from an extrinsic cause, and is partly subject to the will.  It is due to an extrinsic cause, in so far as it is a passion resulting from the imagination of an imminent evil.  In this sense it is possible for fear to be the object of fear, i.e. a man may fear lest he should be threatened by the necessity of fearing, through being assailed by some great evil.  It is subject to the will, in so far as the lower appetite obeys reason; wherefore man is able to drive fear away.  In this sense fear cannot be the object of fear, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33).  Lest, however, anyone make use of his arguments, in order to prove that fear cannot be at all be the object of fear, we must add a solution to the same.