Reply Obj. 1:  The evil of nature sometimes is not an effect of nature, as stated above.  But in so far as it is an effect of nature, although it may be impossible to avoid it entirely, yet it may be possible to delay it.  And with this hope one may take counsel about avoiding it.

Reply Obj. 2:  Although evil of nature ever threatens, yet it does not always threaten from near at hand:  and consequently it is not always feared.

Reply Obj. 3:  Death and other defects of nature are the effects of the common nature; and yet the individual nature rebels against them as far as it can.  Accordingly, from the inclination of the individual nature arise pain and sorrow for such like evils, when present; fear when threatening in the future. ________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 42, Art. 3]

Whether the Evil of Sin Is an Object of Fear?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the evil of sin can be an object of fear.  For Augustine says on the canonical Epistle of John (Tract. ix), that “by chaste fear man fears to be severed from God.”  Now nothing but sin severs us from God; according to Isa. 59:2:  “Your iniquities have divided between you and your God.”  Therefore the evil of sin can be an object of fear.

Obj. 2:  Further, Cicero says (Quaest.  Tusc. iv, 4, 6) that “we fear when they are yet to come, those things which give us pain when they are present.”  But it is possible for one to be pained or sorrowful on account of the evil of sin.  Therefore one can also fear the evil of sin.

Obj. 3:  Further, hope is contrary to fear.  But the good of virtue can be the object of hope, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. ix, 4):  and the Apostle says (Gal. 5:10):  “I have confidence in you in the Lord, that you will not be of another mind.”  Therefore fear can regard evil of sin.

Obj. 4:  Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above (Q. 41, A. 4).  But shame regards a disgraceful deed, which is an evil of sin.  Therefore fear does so likewise.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that “not all evils are feared, for instance that someone be unjust or slow.”

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 40, A. 1; Q. 41, A. 2), as the object of hope is a future good difficult but possible to obtain, so the object of fear is a future evil, arduous and not to be easily avoided.  From this we may gather that whatever is entirely subject to our power and will, is not an object of fear; and that nothing gives rise to fear save what is due to an external cause.  Now human will is the proper cause of the evil of sin:  and consequently evil of sin, properly speaking, is not an object of fear.

But since the human will may be inclined to sin by an extrinsic cause; if this cause have a strong power of inclination, in that respect a man may fear the evil of sin, in so far as it arises from that extrinsic cause:  as when he fears to dwell in the company of wicked men, lest he be led by them to sin.  But, properly speaking, a man thus disposed, fears the being led astray rather than the sin considered in its proper nature, i.e. as a voluntary act; for considered in this light it is not an object of fear to him.