wherefore things devoid of knowledge cannot be said to take pleasure or to be sorrowful:  or else it is because such like movements are contrary to the very nature of natural inclination:  for instance, despair flies from good on account of some difficulty; and fear shrinks from repelling a contrary evil; both of which are contrary to the inclination of nature.  Wherefore such like passions are in no way ascribed to inanimate beings.

Thus the Replies to the Objections are evident.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 41, Art. 4]

Whether the Species of Fear Are Suitably Assigned?

Objection 1:  It would seem that six species of fear are unsuitably assigned by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15); namely, “laziness, shamefacedness, shame, amazement, stupor, and anxiety.”  Because, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), “fear regards a saddening evil.”  Therefore the species of fear should correspond to the species of sorrow.  Now there are four species of sorrow, as stated above (Q. 35, A. 8).  Therefore there should only be four species of fear corresponding to them.

Obj. 2:  Further, that which consists in an action of our own is in our power.  But fear regards an evil that surpasses our power, as stated above (A. 2).  Therefore laziness, shamefacedness, and shame, which regard our own actions, should not be reckoned as species of fear.

Obj. 3:  Further, fear is of the future, as stated above (AA. 1, 2).  But “shame regards a disgraceful deed already done,” as Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat.  Hom. xx.] says.  Therefore shame is not a species of fear.

Obj. 4:  Further, fear is only of evil.  But amazement and stupor regard great and unwonted things, whether good or evil.  Therefore amazement and stupor are not species of fear.

Obj. 5:  Further, Philosophers have been led by amazement to seek the truth, as stated in the beginning of Metaph. But fear leads to flight rather than to search.  Therefore amazement is not a species of fear.

On the contrary suffices the authority of Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius] (Cf.  Obj. 1, 3).

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), fear regards a future evil which surpasses the power of him that fears, so that it is irresistible.  Now man’s evil, like his good, may be considered either in his action or in external things.  In his action he has a twofold evil to fear.  First, there is the toil that burdens his nature:  and hence arises laziness, as when a man shrinks from work for fear of too much toil.  Secondly, there is the disgrace which damages him in the opinion of others.  And thus, if disgrace is feared in a deed that is yet to be done, there is shamefacedness; if, however, it be a deed already done, there is shame.