Reply Obj. 2:  When a man desires a thing and reckons that he can get it, he believes that he can get it, he believes that he will get it; and from this belief which precedes in the cognitive power, the ensuing movement in the appetite is called confidence.  Because the movement of the appetite takes its name from the knowledge that precedes it, as an effect from a cause which is better known; for the apprehensive power knows its own act better than that of the appetite.

Reply Obj. 3:  Certainty is ascribed to the movement, not only of the sensitive, but also of the natural appetite; thus we say that a stone is certain to tend downwards.  This is owing to the inerrancy which the movement of the sensitive or even natural appetite derives from the certainty of the knowledge that precedes it. ________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 3]

Whether Hope Is in Dumb Animals?

Objection 1:  It would seem that there is no hope in dumb animals.  Because hope is for some future good, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12).  But knowledge of the future is not in the competency of dumb animals, whose knowledge is confined to the senses and does not extend to the future.  Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals.

Obj. 2:  Further, the object of hope is a future good, possible of attainment.  But possible and impossible are differences of the true and the false, which are only in the mind, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vi, 4).  Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals, since they have no mind.

Obj. 3:  Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that “animals are moved by the things that they see.”  But hope is of things unseen:  “for what a man seeth, why doth he hope for?” (Rom. 8:24).  Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals.

On the contrary, Hope is an irascible passion.  But the irascible faculty is in dumb animals.  Therefore hope is also.

I answer that, The internal passions of animals can be gathered from their outward movements:  from which it is clear that hope is in dumb animals.  For if a dog see a hare, or a hawk see a bird, too far off, it makes no movement towards it, as having no hope to catch it:  whereas, if it be near, it makes a movement towards it, as being in hopes of catching it.  Because as stated above (Q. 1, A. 2; Q. 26, A. 1; Q. 35, A. 1), the sensitive appetite of dumb animals, and likewise the natural appetite of insensible things, result from the apprehension of an intellect, just as the appetite of the intellectual nature, which is called the will.  But there is a difference, in that the will is moved by an apprehension of the intellect in the same subject; whereas the movement of the natural appetite results from the apprehension of the separate Intellect, Who is the Author of nature; as does also the sensitive appetite of dumb animals, who act from a certain natural instinct.  Consequently, in the actions of irrational animals and of other natural things, we observe a procedure which is similar to that which we observe in the actions of art:  and in this way hope and despair are in dumb animals.