I answer that, It is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man’s greatest evil.  For all sorrow or pain is either for something that is truly evil, or for something that is apparently evil, but good in reality.  Now pain or sorrow for that which is truly evil cannot be the greatest evil:  for there is something worse, namely, either not to reckon as evil that which is really evil, or not to reject it.  Again, sorrow or pain, for that which is apparently evil, but really good, cannot be the greatest evil, for it would be worse to be altogether separated from that which is truly good.  Hence it is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man’s greatest evil.

Reply Obj. 1:  Pleasure and sorrow have two good points in common:  namely, a true judgment concerning good and evil; and the right order of the will in approving of good and rejecting evil.  Thus it is clear that in pain or sorrow there is a good, by the removal of which they become worse:  and yet there is not an evil in every pleasure, by the removal of which the pleasure is better.  Consequently, a pleasure can be man’s highest good, in the way above stated (Q. 34, A. 3):  whereas sorrow cannot be man’s greatest evil.

Reply Obj. 2:  The very fact of the will being opposed to evil is a good.  And for this reason, sorrow or pain cannot be the greatest evil; because it has an admixture of good.

Reply Obj. 3:  That which harms the better thing is worse than that which harms the worse.  Now a thing is called evil “because it harms,” as Augustine says (Enchiridion xii).  Therefore that which is an evil to the soul is a greater evil than that which is an evil to the body.  Therefore this argument does not prove:  nor does Augustine give it as his own, but as taken from another [Cornelius Celsus]. ________________________

QUESTION 40

OF THE IRASCIBLE PASSIONS, AND FIRST, OF HOPE AND DESPAIR (In Eight Articles)

We must now consider the irascible passions:  (1) Hope and despair; (2) Fear and daring; (3) Anger.  Under first head there are eight points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether hope is the same as desire or cupidity?

(2) Whether hope is in the apprehensive, or in the appetitive faculty?

(3) Whether hope is in dumb animals?

(4) Whether despair is contrary to hope?

(5) Whether experience is a cause of hope?

(6) Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards?

(7) Concerning the order of hope to love;

(8) Whether love conduces to action?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 1]

Whether Hope Is the Same As Desire or Cupidity?

Objection 1:  It would seem that hope is the same as desire or cupidity.  Because hope is reckoned as one of the four principal passions.  But Augustine in setting down the four principal passions puts cupidity in the place of hope (De Civ.  Dei xiv, 3, 7).  Therefore hope is the same as cupidity or desire.