Reply Obj. 2:  Just as sorrow for an evil arises from a right will and reason, which detest the evil, so sorrow for a good is due to a perverse reason and will, which detest the good.  Consequently such sorrow is an obstacle to the praise and merit of the virtuous good; for instance, when a man gives an alms sorrowfully.

Reply Obj. 3:  Some things do actually happen, not because God wills, but because He permits them to happen—­such as sins.  Consequently a will that is opposed to sin, whether in oneself or in another, is not discordant from the Divine will.  Penal evils happen actually, even by God’s will.  But it is not necessary for the rectitude of his will, that man should will them in themselves:  but only that he should not revolt against the order of Divine justice, as stated above (Q. 19, A. 10). ________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 39, Art. 3]

Whether Sorrow Can Be a Useful Good?

Objection 1:  It would seem that sorrow cannot be a useful good.  For it is written (Ecclus. 30:25):  “Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it.”

Obj. 2:  Further, choice is of that which is useful to an end.  But sorrow is not an object of choice; in fact, “a thing without sorrow is to be chosen rather than the same thing with sorrow” (Topic. iii, 2).  Therefore sorrow is not a useful good.

Obj. 3:  Further, “Everything is for the sake of its own operation,” as stated in De Coelo ii, 3.  But “sorrow hinders operation,” as stated in Ethic. x, 5.  Therefore sorrow is not a useful good.

On the contrary, The wise man seeks only that which is useful.  But according to Eccles. 7:5, “the heart of the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where there is mirth.”  Therefore sorrow is useful.

I answer that, A twofold movement of the appetite ensues from a present evil.  One is that whereby the appetite is opposed to the present evil; and, in this respect, sorrow is of no use; because that which is present, cannot be not present.  The other movement arises in the appetite to the effect of avoiding or expelling the saddening evil:  and, in this respect, sorrow is of use, if it be for something which ought to be avoided.  Because there are two reasons for which it may be right to avoid a thing.  First, because it should be avoided in itself, on account of its being contrary to good; for instance, sin.  Wherefore sorrow for sin is useful as inducing a man to avoid sin:  hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:9):  “I am glad:  not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance.”  Secondly, a thing is to be avoided, not as though it were evil in itself, but because it is an occasion of evil; either through one’s being attached to it, and loving it too much, or through one’s being thrown headlong thereby into an evil, as is evident in the case of temporal goods.  And, in this respect, sorrow for temporal goods may be useful; according to Eccles. 7:3:  “It is better to go to the house of mourning, than to the house of feasting:  for in that we are put in mind of the end of all.”