Reply Obj. 2:  The relation of effect to cause is like the relation of the object of pleasure to him that takes pleasure in it:  because in each case the one agrees with the other.  Now every like thing increases its like.  Therefore joy is increased by laughter and the other effects of joy:  except they be excessive, in which case, accidentally, they lessen it.

Reply Obj. 3:  The image of that which saddens us, considered in itself, has a natural tendency to increase sorrow:  yet from the very fact that a man imagines himself to be doing that which is fitting according to his actual state, he feels a certain amount of pleasure.  For the same reason if laughter escapes a man when he is so disposed that he thinks he ought to weep, he is sorry for it, as having done something unbecoming to him, as Cicero says (De Tusc.  Quaest. iii, 27). ________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 38, Art. 3]

Whether Pain or Sorrow Are Assuaged by the Sympathy of Friends?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the sorrow of sympathizing friends does not assuage our own sorrow.  For contraries have contrary effects.  Now as Augustine says (Confess. viii, 4), “when many rejoice together, each one has more exuberant joy, for they are kindled and inflamed one by the other.”  Therefore, in like manner, when many are sorrowful, it seems that their sorrow is greater.

Obj. 2:  Further, friendship demands mutual love, as Augustine declares (Confess. iv, 9).  But a sympathizing friend is pained at the sorrow of his friend with whom he sympathizes.  Consequently the pain of a sympathizing friend becomes, to the friend in sorrow, a further cause of sorrow:  so that, his pain being doubled his sorrow seems to increase.

Obj. 3:  Further, sorrow arises from every evil affecting a friend, as though it affected oneself:  since “a friend is one’s other self” (Ethic. ix, 4, 9).  But sorrow is an evil.  Therefore the sorrow of the sympathizing friend increases the sorrow of the friend with whom he sympathizes.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 11) that those who are in pain are consoled when their friends sympathize with them.

I answer that, When one is in pain, it is natural that the sympathy of a friend should afford consolation:  whereof the Philosopher indicates a twofold reason (Ethic. ix, 11).  The first is because, since sorrow has a depressing effect, it is like a weight whereof we strive to unburden ourselves:  so that when a man sees others saddened by his own sorrow, it seems as though others were bearing the burden with him, striving, as it were, to lessen its weight; wherefore the load of sorrow becomes lighter for him:  something like what occurs in the carrying of bodily burdens.  The second and better reason is because when a man’s friends condole with him, he sees that he is loved by them, and this affords him pleasure, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 5).  Consequently, since every pleasure assuages sorrow, as stated above (A. 1), it follows that sorrow is mitigated by a sympathizing friend.