Reply Obj. 1:  Moderate sorrow, that does not cause the mind to wander, can conduce to the acquisition of learning especially in regard to those things by which a man hopes to be freed from sorrow.  And thus, “in the tribulation of murmuring,” men are more apt to be taught by God.

Reply Obj. 2:  Both pleasure and pain, in so far as they draw upon themselves the soul’s intention, hinder the reason from the act of consideration, wherefore it is stated in Ethic. vii, 11 that “in the moment of sexual pleasure, a man cannot understand anything.”  Nevertheless pain attracts the soul’s intention more than pleasure does:  thus we observe in natural things that the action of a natural body is more intense in regard to its contrary; for instance, hot water is more accessible to the action of cold, and in consequence freezes harder.  If therefore pain or sorrow be moderate, it can conduce accidentally to the facility of learning, in so far as it takes away an excess of pleasure.  But, of itself, it is a hindrance; and if it be intense, it prevents it altogether.

Reply Obj. 3:  External pain arises from hurt done to the body, so that it involves bodily transmutation more than inward sorrow does:  and yet the latter is greater in regard to the formal element of pain, which belongs to the soul.  Consequently bodily pain is a greater hindrance to contemplation which requires complete repose, than inward sorrow is.  Nevertheless if inward sorrow be very intense, it attracts the intention, so that man is unable to learn anything for the first time:  wherefore on account of sorrow Gregory interrupted his commentary on Ezechiel (Hom. xxii in Ezechiel). ________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 37, Art. 2]

Whether the Effect of Sorrow or Pain Is to Burden the Soul?

Objection 1:  It would seem that it is not an effect of sorrow to burden the soul.  For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:11):  “Behold this self-same thing, that you were made sorrowful according to God, how great carefulness it worketh in you:  yea, defence, yea indignation,” etc.  Now carefulness and indignation imply that the soul is uplifted, which is contrary to being depressed.  Therefore depression is not an effect of sorrow.

Obj. 2:  Further, sorrow is contrary to pleasure.  But the effect of pleasure is expansion:  the opposite of which is not depression but contraction.  Therefore depression should not be reckoned as an effect of sorrow.

Obj. 3:  Further, sorrow consumes those who are inflicted therewith, as may be gathered from the words of the Apostle (2 Cor. 2:7):  “Lest perhaps such an one be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow.”  But that which is depressed is not consumed; nay, it is weighed down by something heavy, whereas that which is consumed enters within the consumer.  Therefore depression should not be reckoned an effect of sorrow.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat.  Hom. xix.] and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) speak of “depressing sorrow.”