Whether, If Happiness Is in the Intellective Part, It Is an Operation of the Intellect or of the Will?

Objection 1:  It would seem that happiness consists in an act of the will.  For Augustine says (De Civ.  Dei xix, 10, 11), that man’s happiness consists in peace; wherefore it is written (Ps. 147:3):  “Who hath placed peace in thy end [Douay:  ’borders’]”.  But peace pertains to the will.  Therefore man’s happiness is in the will.

Obj. 2:  Further, happiness is the supreme good.  But good is the object of the will.  Therefore happiness consists in an operation of the will.

Obj. 3:  Further, the last end corresponds to the first mover:  thus the last end of the whole army is victory, which is the end of the general, who moves all the men.  But the first mover in regard to operations is the will:  because it moves the other powers, as we shall state further on (Q. 9, AA. 1, 3).  Therefore happiness regards the will.

Obj. 4:  Further, if happiness be an operation, it must needs be man’s most excellent operation.  But the love of God, which is an act of the will, is a more excellent operation than knowledge, which is an operation of the intellect, as the Apostle declares (1 Cor. 13).  Therefore it seems that happiness consists in an act of the will.

Obj. 5:  Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that “happy is he who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss.”  And a little further on (6) he adds:  “He is most happy who desires well, whatever he desires:  for good things make a man happy, and such a man already possesses some good—­i.e. a good will.”  Therefore happiness consists in an act of the will.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (John 17:3):  “This is eternal life:  that they may know Thee, the only true God.”  Now eternal life is the last end, as stated above (A. 2, ad 1).  Therefore man’s happiness consists in the knowledge of God, which is an act of the intellect.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 2, A. 6) two things are needed for happiness:  one, which is the essence of happiness:  the other, that is, as it were, its proper accident, i.e. the delight connected with it.  I say, then, that as to the very essence of happiness, it is impossible for it to consist in an act of the will.  For it is evident from what has been said (AA. 1, 2; Q. 2, A. 7) that happiness is the attainment of the last end.  But the attainment of the end does not consist in the very act of the will.  For the will is directed to the end, both absent, when it desires it; and present, when it is delighted by resting therein.  Now it is evident that the desire itself of the end is not the attainment of the end, but is a movement towards the end:  while delight comes to the will from the end being present; and not conversely, is a thing made present, by the fact that the will delights in it.  Therefore, that the end be present to him who desires it, must be due to something else than an act of the will.