Reply Obj. 2:  Inward pain is not caused by the apprehended likeness of a thing:  for a man is not inwardly pained by the apprehended likeness itself, but by the thing which the likeness represents.  And this thing is all the more perfectly apprehended by means of its likeness, as this likeness is more immaterial and abstract.  Consequently inward pain is, of itself, greater, as being caused by a greater evil, forasmuch as evil is better known by an inward apprehension.

Reply Obj. 3:  Bodily changes are more liable to be caused by outward pain, both from the fact that outward pain is caused by a corruptive conjoined corporally, which is a necessary condition of the sense of touch; and from the fact that the outward sense is more material than the inward sense, just as the sensitive appetite is more material than the intellective.  For this reason, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3; Q. 31, A. 5), the body undergoes a greater change from the movement of the sensitive appetite:  and, in like manner, from outward than from inward pain. ________________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 8]

Whether There Are Only Four Species of Sorrow?

Objection 1:  It would seem that Damascene’s (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) division of sorrow into four species is incorrect; viz. into “torpor, distress,” which Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat.  Hom. xix.] calls “anxiety,”—­“pity,” and “envy.”  For sorrow is contrary to pleasure.  But there are not several species of pleasure.  Therefore it is incorrect to assign different species of sorrow.

Obj. 2:  Further, Repentance is a species of sorrow; and so are indignation and jealousy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9, 11).  But these are not included in the above species.  Therefore this division is insufficient.

Obj. 3:  Further, the members of a division should be things that are opposed to one another.  But these species are not opposed to one another.  For according to Gregory [Nemesius, De Nat.  Hom. xix.] “torpor is sorrow depriving of speech; anxiety is the sorrow that weighs down; envy is sorrow for another’s good; pity is sorrow for another’s wrongs.”  But it is possible for one to sorrow for another’s wrongs, and for another’s good, and at the same time to be weighed down inwardly, and outwardly to be speechless.  Therefore this division is incorrect.

On the contrary, stands the twofold authority of Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius] and of Damascene.

I answer that, It belongs to the notion of a species that it is something added to the genus.  But a thing can be added to a genus in two ways.  First, as something belonging of itself to the genus, and virtually contained therein:  thus “rational” is added to “animal.”  Such an addition makes true species of a genus:  as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii, 12; viii, 2, 3).  But, secondly, a thing may be added to a genus, that is, as it were,