Nevertheless, in neither of these ways, is the pain thus accidentally mingled with contemplation, contrary to the pleasure thereof.  Because pain caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but rather is in affinity and in harmony with it, as is evident from what has been said above (A. 4):  while pain or sorrow caused by bodily weariness, does not belong to the same genus, wherefore it is altogether disparate.  Accordingly it is evident that no sorrow is contrary to pleasure taken in the very act of contemplation; nor is any sorrow connected with it save accidentally.

Reply Obj. 1:  The “sorrow which is according to God,” is not caused by the very act of intellectual contemplation, but by something which the mind contemplates:  viz. by sin, which the mind considers as contrary to the love of God.

Reply Obj. 2:  Things which are contrary according to nature are not contrary according as they exist in the mind:  for things that are contrary in reality are not contrary in the order of thought; indeed rather is one contrary the reason for knowing the other.  Hence one and the same science considers contraries.

Reply Obj. 3:  Contemplation, in itself, is never evil, since it is nothing else than the consideration of truth, which is the good of the intellect:  it can, however, be evil accidentally, i.e. in so far as the contemplation of a less noble object hinders the contemplation of a more noble object; or on the part of the object contemplated, to which the appetite is inordinately attached.

Reply Obj. 4:  Sorrow caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but is in harmony with it, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 5:  Affliction of the flesh affects contemplation accidentally and indirectly, as stated above. ________________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 6]

Whether Sorrow Is to Be Shunned More Than Pleasure Is to Be Sought?

Objection 1:  It would seem that sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought.  For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 63):  “There is nobody that does not shun sorrow more than he seeks pleasure.”  Now that which all agree in doing, seems to be natural.  Therefore it is natural and right for sorrow to be shunned more than pleasure is sought.

Obj. 2:  Further, the action of a contrary conduces to rapidity and intensity of movement:  for “hot water freezes quicker and harder,” as the Philosopher says (Meteor. i, 12).  But the shunning of sorrow is due to the contrariety of the cause of sorrow; whereas the desire for pleasure does not arise from any contrariety, but rather from the suitableness of the pleasant object.  Therefore sorrow is shunned more eagerly than pleasure is sought.